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PARTIAL UNCONSTITUTIONALITY 
KEVIN C. WALSH* 
Courts often hold legislation unconstitutional, but nearly always only part of the 
statute offends. The problem of partial unconstitutionality is therefore pervasive 
and persistent. Yet the exclusive doctrinal tool for dealing with this problem-sever-
ability doctrine-is deeply flawed. To make matters worse, severability doctrine is 
purportedly necessary for any workable system of judicial review. The accepted 
view is that severance saves: A court faced with a partially unconstitutional law 
must sever and excise the unconstitutional provisions or applications so that the 
constitutional remainder can be enforced going forward. Absent severance and 
excision, a law must fall in its entirety. This excision-based understanding of judi-
cial review is supposedly traceable to Marbury v. Madison. In fact, this attribution 
is anachronistic. Moreover, the prevailing view is wrong about the distinctive func-
tion of modern severability doctrine, which is not to save, but to destroy. This 
Article retrieves the original approach to partial unconstitutionality and develops a 
proposal for implementing a version of that approach. The proposal, displacement 
without inferred fallback law, is simultaneously ambitious and modest. It is ambi-
tious because it proposes a shift in the general framework for judicial review in 
every case; it is modest because the proposed shift would change case outcomes in 
only a small set of highly consequential cases. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Many laws are unconstitutional, but few are entirely so. As a 
result, partial unconstitutionality is pervasive. Sometimes a statute's 
unconstitutionality resides in a discrete textual provision, such as a 
legislative veto in a complex immigration statute1 or a private cause of 
action for gender-motivated violence in a massive crime bill.2 More 
commonly, a statute's unconstitutionality inheres in some applications 
of the statute but not others, such as a speech restriction that is uncon-
stitutional as applied to speech on public sidewalks but not else-
where,3 or heightened protection for religious liberty that is 
unconstitutional as applied to states and localities but constitutional as 
applied to the federal government.4 Although often unnoticed, almost 
every instance of judicial review presents an issue of partial unconsti-
tutionality in one form or another. 
The problem of what to do with partially unconstitutional laws 
has a long pedigree. Marbury v. Madison, for instance, resulted in a 
holding of partial unconstitutionality.5 The Court held unconstitu-
tional just one part of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (Section 13) and just 
some applications of that part (Supreme Court issuance of writs of 
mandamus in the exercise of its original jurisdiction).6 Chief Justice 
Marshall's reasoning in Marbury continues to frame the problem of 
partial unconstitutionality today. Following Marshall's reasoning, the 
question asked by a court engaged in judicial review is whether the act 
1 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 956-59 (1983) (invalidating Immigration and 
Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 414, § 244(b), (c), 66 Stat. 163, 216 (1952)). 
2 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (invalidating Violence 
Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 40302(c), 108 Stat. 1796, 1941). 
3 See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 183 (1983) (invalidating in part Act of 
August 18, 1949, Pub. L. No. 250, § 6, 63 Stat. 616, 617 as applied to public sidewalks 
surrounding Supreme Court building). 
4 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534-36 (1997) (invalidating in part 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 6(a), 107 Stat. 
1488, 1489 as applied to state and local governments). 
5 5 U.S. (1Cranch)137, 176-80 (1803) (holding that portion of Judiciary Act of 1789 
allowing Supreme Court "to issue writs of mandamus to public officers" conflicts with 
Constitution and is therefore void). 
6 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As·Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 
113 HARV. L. REv. 1321, 1337 n.91 (2000) ("[T]he Court did not invalidate that linguistic 
unit of the [Judiciary Act of 1789] insofar as it authorized the Supreme Court to issue writs 
of mandamus in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction."). 
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of the legislature is "void."7 A holding of unconstitutionality is, there-
fore, a holding of voidness. If a legislative act is void, how can any 
portion of it be enforced after a judicial pronouncement of 
unconstitutionality? 
Current law and scholarship answer that severability doctrine is 
the exclusive way to deal with partial unconstitutionality. Severability 
doctrine governs whether a court may first separate out or "sever" the 
unconstitutional provisions or applications of a law, and then subtract 
or "excise" them, so the constitutional remainder can be enforced 
going forward. Thus conceived, this judicial operation creates a new 
law that consists of the old law "minus" its unconstitutional provisions 
or applications.s 
The lodestar for this severability determination is legislative 
intent. Because a court must not "use its remedial powers to circum-
vent the intent of the legislature,"9 the court must ask before severing: 
"Would the legislature have preferred what is left of its statute to no 
statute at all?"10 If the answer is "no," then the court should not sever 
but instead should declare the statute entirely invalid and enjoin its 
enforcement in all applications. 
As the doctrinal formula for determining severability reveals, the 
required inquiry into legislative intent is unlike many other interpre-
tive inquiries, in that it asks what the legislature would have done, not 
what the legislature actually did. 11 Thus, the doctrine leaves courts 
with significant discretion in deciding whether and how to sever and 
excise statutes. Legislatures that enact partially unconstitutional laws 
may not foresee their constitutional flaws and may not articulate a 
7 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177. 
8 Michael C. Dorf, Fallback Law, 107 CoLUM. L. REv. 303, 305 (2007) ("[A] sever-
ability clause ... provides that in the event that the original Jaw is held partly invalid, a 
fallback of the original Jaw minus the invalid provision or application will take effect."); see 
also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies-And Their 
Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REv. 633, 674-75 (2006) ("[T]he normal pre-
sumption of constitutional Jaw is that statutes are 'severable' (or, synonymously, 'sepa-
rable'): Even if a statute has unconstitutional components or would be unconstitutional as 
applied to particular facts, the unconstitutional elements or applications can be severed 
from the valid ones and the valid ones enforced."). 
9 Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 330 (2006) (quoting 
Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 94 (1979)). 
10 Id. Additionally, the Court assumes that "Congress could not have intended a consti-
tutionally flawed provision to be severed from the remainder of the statute if the balance 
of the legislation is incapable of functioning independently." Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 
480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987). 
11 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005) (stating that severability 
depends on "what 'Congress would have intended' in light of the Court's constitutional 
holding") (citation omitted). 
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preference about how to cure any constitutional flaws that they do 
foresee. 
Those who trust the judiciary to work things out by discerning the 
legislature's unstated intent about a matter that it never addressed 
when legislating can take heart from the current approach to partial 
unconstitutionality. The rest of us should be concerned. The problem 
is not simply that severability doctrine vests courts with substantial 
discretion, but that it does so in an area of the law in which the stakes 
are high. 
The deployment of severability doctrine can be highly conse-
quential because the doctrine allows a court to declare entirely invalid 
a law that is only partially unconstitutional.12 The doctrine may also 
metastasize invalidity beyond unconstitutionality even when it yields 
the conclusion that particular statutory provisions are severable. For 
example, in the Supreme Court's recent high-profile deployment of 
the doctrine in Booker v. United States, the Court "severed and 
excised" two statutory provisions-one that made the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines binding and another that governed appellate 
review of federal sentencing.13 As a consequence of the Court's sup-
position about what the enacting Congress would have intended about 
a problem that it neither anticipated nor addressed when legislating, 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are now nonbinding even in the 
thousands upon thousands of cases in which binding Guidelines pose 
no constitutional problem. 
If severability doctrine is threatening because of the significant 
discretion it vests in courts to invalidate a statute beyond just those 
uses and provisions that are unconstitutional, why do we have it? 
Mostly, it seems, because of the belief that we cannot do without it. 
Seen or unseen, severability doctrine is omnipresent in judicial review 
as currently understood. According to existing case law and scholar-
ship, every holding of partial unconstitutionality that does not lead to 
total invalidation necessarily rests on severability, implicitly if not 
explicitly. Indeed, according to Michael Dorf, "no workable system of 
judicial review could function without a large role for severability."14 
12 See, e.g., Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 635-37 (1895) (invali-
dating as inseparable all income tax provisions of federal tax statute after determining that 
provisions taxing income derived from real and personal property were unconstitutional). 
13 Booker, 543 U.S. at 259 ("(W]e must sever and excise two specific statutory provi-
sions: the provision that requires sentencing courts to impose a sentence within the appli-
cable Guidelines range ... and the provision that sets forth standards of review on appeal 
.... ") (citation omitted). 
14 Dorf, supra note 8, at 370. 
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Operating on the assumption that severability is inevitable in one 
form or another, scholars have leveled many criticisms at its doctrinal 
particulars and offered proposals for reform. But nothing has 
changed. Modern severability doctrine exists in much the same form 
today as when it emerged in the mid-nineteenth century. 
This Article changes the terms of the problem by demonstrating 
that the counterfactual speculation required by modern severability 
doctrine is not necessary to a workable system of judicial review. 
While there must be a means of specifying the scope of invalidity 
flowing from a holding of unconstitutionality, modern severability 
doctrine is not the only such means. 
Although the history of severability has already been written, 15 
there is a notable gap in doctrinal history: There exists no sustained 
scholarly treatment of judicial responses to partially unconstitutional 
statutes prior to the emergence of legislative intent-based severability 
analysis in the 1850s. This Article begins to fill that gap by recovering 
the operative approach to partial unconstitutionality in the first sev-
eral decades of judicial review following Marbury. The evidence that 
emerges disproves the prevailing notion that judicial review without 
modern severability doctrine is unworkable. That widely accepted 
notion rests on an anachronistic attribution of modern severability 
doctrine to Chief Justice Marshall, his immediate successors on the 
federal bench, and their state-court contemporaries. Whatever else 
may be said about the first several decades of post-Marbury judicial 
review in the United States, it was workable. And it worked without 
modern hypothetical-intent-based severability doctrine. 
Judicial review can work that way again today. Most fundamen-
tally, it is necessary to change the foundational metaphor that struc-
tures thinking about judicial review-a change from excision to 
displacement. The familiar excision-based approach to judicial review 
implies that a court has the power to eliminate unconstitutional provi-
sions by a process of subtraction. In contrast, under a displacement-
based approach, a court does not excise anything from a statute but 
instead determines the extent to which superior law displaces inferior 
law in resolving the particular case before it. 
15 See Mark L. Movsesian, Severability in Statutes and Contracts, 30 GA. L. REv. 41, 
66-73 (1995) (discussing inlproper importation of contract law concepts into statutory sev-
erability analysis); John Copeland Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L. REv. 203, 210-25 (1993) 
(tracing development of Supreme Court jurisprudence on severability doctrine); Michael 
D. Shumsky, Severability, lnseverability, and the Rule of Law, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 227, 
240-43 (2004) (describing Supreme Court's reassertion of severability doctrine in historical 
context of New Deal); Robert L. Stern, Separability and Separability Clauses in the 
Supreme Coun, 51 HARV. L. REv. 76, 79-82 (1937) (surveying history and evolution of 
severability doctrine). 
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After changing the foundational metaphor, a question remains 
about the scope of displacement. First principles dictate that superior 
law can displace no less of the inferior law than is repugnant to it, but 
what about more? The proposed approach instructs courts not to infer 
invalidity beyond unconstitutionality. The goal is for the enforceable 
law resulting from an exercise of judicial re'view to be traceable to a 
combination of constitutional command and legislative provision, 
rather than judicial supposition about what the legislature would have 
wanted. 
For too long, judicial rewriting through severability doctrine has 
been accepted as inevitable. This perceived inevitability has kept the 
debate centered on how courts should rewrite statutes, bypassing 
entirely the antecedent question of whether they should do so. 
This Article proposes a restoration of review without rewriting. It 
proceeds in three parts. Part I explicates existing doctrine and its 
flaws. Part II explains how courts in the United States dealt with par-
tially unconstitutional statutes before the emergence of legislative 
intent-based severability doctrine in the 1850s. Part III expounds a 
reconstructed version of the earlier approach to partial unconstitu-
tionality that can be implemented in constitutional adjudication in 
present times. 
I 
EXCISION 
This Part lays the groundwork for the historical analysis in Part II 
and the doctrinal reconstruction in Part III. This Part first describes 
the function of severability doctrine in existing law and its fit in the 
prevailing excision-based approach to judicial review. It then explores 
the problems with severability doctrine and the approach to judicial 
review in which it is embedded. 
A. The Nature of Severability Doctrine 
Severability doctrine governs the decision whether to sever a par-
tially unconstitutional statute. It is one tool for implementing the 
Supreme Court's general approach to constitutional remedies: to "try 
to limit the solution to the problem."16 When the constitutional 
problem does not inhere in all of a statute's applications or provisions, 
a reviewing court should, if otherwise appropriate, "enjoin only the 
unconstitutional applications of a statute while leaving other applica-
tions in force, or ... sever its problematic portions while leaving the 
16 Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 328 (2006). 
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remainder intact."17 These forms of less-than-total invalidation are 
typically (if awkwardly) referred to as "application severability" and 
"text severability" respectively.18 
Severability doctrine sets legislative intent as a constraint on 
when courts can "limit the solution to the problem."19 If the legisla-
ture would not have enacted the unconstitutional law without its 
unconstitutional provisions or applications, the doctrine calls for 
courts to invalidate the legislation in its entirety.20 The phrasing of the 
doctrinal test and the inherently counterfactual nature of the problem 
reveal that the required inquiry into legislative intent is unlike inter-
pretive inquiries that aim to uncover what the legislature actually pro-
vided for in its legislation. Severability doctrine asks what the 
legislature would have done, not what the legislature actually did.21 
A legislature may try to control the severability determination by 
expressing its intent in a severability or inseverability clause.22 
Although one might expect that such a clause unambiguously con-
veying legislative intent would be dispositive, severability doctrine 
provides that such clauses are neither necessary nor sufficient to con-
trol the judicial determination of severability.23 Under federal law, 
"the inclusion of [a severability] clause creates a presumption that 
Congress did not intend the validity of the statute in question to 
17 Id. (citation omitted). 
18 See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Facial Challenges and Federalism, 105 CoLUM. L. REv. 
873, 885 & n.52 (2005) (distinguishing "application severability" from "text severability" 
and identifying sources that discuss them); Adrian Vermuele, Saving Constructions, 85 
GEo. L.J. 1945, 1950 n.26 (1997) ("[S)everability problems arise not only with respect to 
different sections, clauses or provisions of a statute, but also with respect to applications of 
a particular statutory provision when some (but not all) of those applications are 
unconstitutional."). 
19 Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 328. 
20 See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 249 (2005) (opting not to engraft 
constitutional requirements onto existing sentencing scheme on ground that Congress 
would have preferred total invalidation). 
21 Id. at 257-58. 
22 See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 454 (2006) ("If any provision of this Act, or the application 
thereof to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of the 
Act and the application of such provision to other persons and circumstances shall not be 
affected thereby."). 
23 See, e.g., Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 290 {1924) (describing severability clause 
as "[an] aid in determining [legislative] intent ... not an inexorable command"); Shumsky, 
supra note 15, at 230 ("Despite the unambiguous command of severability and insever-
ability clauses, the Court has repeatedly held that they create only a rebuttable presump-
tion that guides-but does not control-a reviewing court's severability determination."). 
For a general discussion of inseverability clauses, see Israel E. Friedman, Note, 
Inseverability Clauses in Statutes, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 903, 907-09 (1997). 
Reprinted with ~ennission of New York University School of Law 
June 2010] PARTIAL UNCONSTITUTIONALITY 745 
depend on the validity of the constitutionally offensive provision," but 
it does not dictate the outcome.24 
Because severability depends on legislative intent, "questions 
about the meaning and thus the separability of state statutes are pri-
marily questions of state law," while "[t]he separability of a federal 
statute is ... a purely federal issue."25 Because the precise nature of 
the severability analysis to be performed depends on the type of law 
being analyzed (i.e., federal or state law), doctrinal reform of sever-
ability doctrine cannot be performed in one fell swoop-the federal 
system and each state system must be addressed individually. Yet it is 
still reasonable to generalize about severability doctrine using federal 
law and to propose a solution for implementation in the federal and 
state systems alike because state doctrinal systems closely approxi-
mate federal doctrine.26 
B. The Excision-Based Approach to Judicial Review 
Severability doctrine is currently nestled within an excision-based 
approach to judicial review. Within this approach, severability is the 
exclusive doctrinal tool for dealing with the problem of partial uncon-
stitutionality. But while partial unconstitutionality is ubiquitous, 
explicit discussions of severability are not. Courts and scholars explain 
the absence of explicit severability reasoning from cases involving par-
tial unconstitutionality by attributing implicit severability analysis to 
those decisions.27 These attributions of implicit severability rest on an 
excision-based understanding of judicial review. 
According to this understanding, a court facing a partially uncon-
stitutional statute proceeds in two steps. First, the court must deter-
mine whether it is possible to "sever" the unconstitutional parts from 
the constitutional parts. Second, the court must "excise" any unconsti-
tutional parts that are severable, so that the constitutional remainder 
24 Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 686 (1987). 
25 RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART & 
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 182-83 (5th ed. 2003). 
26 See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. 
REv. 235, 285 (1994) (noting that federal and state severability doctrines are "remarkably 
uniform" in practice). 
27 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 320-32 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(describing cases in which Supreme Court "disposes of as-applied challenges to a statute by 
simply invalidating particular applications of the statute, without saying anything at all 
about severability"); United States v. Nat'! Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 488 
(1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing precedents that 
held certain statutory applications unconstitutional as "having involved implied sever-
ability"); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 184 (1983) (Marshall, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (describing judgment of partial unconstitutionality as "excising" 
unconstitutional applications from challenged statute). 
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can be enforced going forward.28 If severance and excision are appro-
priate, the result is conceptualized as a new statute that consists of the 
old statute "minus" its unconstitutional parts.29 
Scholars use this theory of excision-based severability doctrine to 
explain not only every instance of partial invalidation, but also every 
instance of as-applied adjudication, whether or not it leads to invalida-
tion. A paradigm case is Yazoo & Mississippi Railroad v. Jackson 
Vinegar Co. ,30 in which the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to a 
Mississippi statute requiring prompt settlement of certain low-dollar-
value claims for lost or damaged goods.31 The Court responded to the 
railroad's constitutional challenge that the statute improperly required 
settlement of even false or frivolous claims by declining to adjudicate 
the constitutionality of the statute itself or even as applied to other 
cases.32 The Court instead considered the statute only as applied to 
the particular claim at issue in the case at hand: The railroad counsel's 
concession that the underlying claim for a damaged shipment of vin-
egar bottles was neither false nor frivolous disposed of the case.33 Said 
the Court: "It suffices . . . to hold that, as applied to cases like the 
present, the statute is valid. "34 
Richard Fallon argues that the Court's refusal in Yazoo to con-
sider the railroad's "facial" challenge is based on "an implicit assump-
tion that statutory rules are reducible to what might be characterized 
as statutory 'sub-rules.' "35 That is, the rule "settle all claims" can be 
divided into the subrules (i) "settle all valid and non-exorbitant 
claims," and (ii) "settle all frivolous and excessive claims.''36 With 
28 See, e.g., Booker, 543 U.S. at 258 ("We now turn to the question of which portions of 
the sentencing statute we must sever and excise as inconsistent with the Court's constitu-
tional requirement."). 
29 See Dorf, supra note 26, at 238 ("[A] statute that has unconstitutional applications 
cannot be constitutionally applied to anyone, even to those whose conduct is not constitu-
tionally privileged, unless the court can sever the unconstitutional applications of the 
statute from the constitutionally permitted ones."); Metzger, supra note 18, at 887-88 ("If 
unconstitutional applications are not severed, the statute cannot be applied to any litigant, 
even one making no claim of constitutional protection for her conduct. On the other hand, 
if unconstitutional applications of a statute can be severed, refusing to apply the statute to 
conduct that is not constitutionally protected becomes unjustified."). 
30 226 U.S. 217 (1912). 
31 Id. at 218-20. 
32 Id. at 219-20. 
33 Id. at 219. 
34 Id. at 219-20. 
35 FALLON ET AL., supra note 25, at 182. According to Fallon, the question in a case like 
Yazoo is "whether a statutory provision that does not on its face reflect divisible linguistic 
units-such as a requirement that railroads must settle 'all claims'-can nonetheless be 
severed into valid and invalid elements." Id. 
36 Id. 
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judicial review understood to be focused on the constitutional validity 
of subrules, severability doctrine enables as-applied adjudication by 
providing the mechanism for subrule (i) to survive even if subrule (ii) 
is invalid.37 
The reason to attribute implicit severance to as-applied adjudica-
tion is to reconcile the practice "with what Henry Monaghan has 
termed the 'valid rule requirement'-the notion that everyone has a 
personal constitutional right not to be subjected to governmental 
sanctions except pursuant to a constitutionally valid rule of law."38 
Michael Dorf explains the logic of this reconciliation, attributing to 
the Yazoo Court the implicit reasoning that "if the statute has uncon-
stitutional applications, they are severable from the constitutional 
applications. "39 
"Excision" is, of course, only a metaphor. There is no judicial 
Exacto knife that courts use to excise words from the statute books. 
When a court holds part of a statute unconstitutional, it issues a judg-
ment saying so (and, in some cases, an injunction against its future 
enforcement). By virtue of precedent and preclusion, this judgment 
and the reasoning in support of it prevent the unconstitutional part of 
the statute from having legal effect going forward.40 Nothing about 
the actual text of the statute changes as a direct consequence of judi-
cial action. 
When a judgment and its supporting reasoning prevent the 
unconstitutional parts of a statute from having legal effect in all cir-
cumstances, it is as if the unconstitutional parts no longer existed, as if 
the court had excised the unconstitutional parts. But, again, this is just 
a manner of speaking. Because the court does not do anything to the 
statute itself, the statute persists as law that can spring back into effect 
if the constitutional barrier to its enforcement is somehow removed. If 
constitutional doctrine changes, then no further legislative action is 
37 See id. ("If the statute is viewed as comprising a number of sub-rules, it becomes 
comprehensible that sub-rule (i) could survive even if sub-rule (ii) were constitutionally 
invalid and had to be severed."). 
38 Fallon, supra note 6, at 1331 (internal citation omitted). 
39 Dorf, supra note 26, at 249. This attribution is necessary to reconcile the Court's 
conclusion with the possibility that the statute had unconstitutional applications because, 
"[i]f the statute requiring railroads to settle all claims promptly is an unconstitutional exer-
cise of the state's authority, then, one would suppose, no railroad should be judged by it, 
even if the railroad's conduct merits no constitutional protection." Id. at 243. 
40 See Fallon, supra note 6, at 1339 ("A court has no power to remove a law from the 
statute books. When a court rules that a statute is invalid-whether as applied, in part, or 
on its face-the legal force of its decision resides in doctrines of claim and issue preclusion 
and of precedent."); David L. Shapiro, State Courts and Federal Declaratory Judgments, 74 
Nw. U. L. REv. 759, 767 (1979) ("No matter what language is used in a judicial opinion, a 
federal court cannot repeal a duly enacted statute of any legislative authority."). 
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necessary for "excised" portions of the statute to regain their legal 
effect.41 
Although excision is only a metaphor, it is a powerful one that 
underwrites the perceived need for severability doctrine. Michael 
Dorf attempts to establish the central role of severability doctrine to 
constitutional adjudication by demonstrating the unworkability of a 
general rule of nonseverability.42 If courts were to apply a rule of non-
severability, Dorf asks, "[W]ould the invalidation of some snippet of 
text imply the invalidation of everything else that was enacted as part 
of the same omnibus bill as that snippet? Would it imply the invalida-
tion of the provision in which the snippet was embedded at the time of 
the challenge?"43 Indeed, Dorf presses, "[w]hy just the provision 
rather than the Code section, the Code title, or the entire U.S. Code 
itself?"44 Dorf concludes that "[b ]ecause the more extreme of these 
options are plainly implausible, courts never face a choice of whether 
to sever invalid provisions or applications from valid ones, but instead 
must always decide how much to sever."45 The argument, in essence, 
is that severability is inevitable because nonseverability is unworkable. 
In sum, severability doctrine is viewed as the exclusive tool for 
dealing with partial unconstitutionality under the prevailing excision-
based understanding of judicial review. According to this under-
standing, "a statute that has unconstitutional applications cannot be 
constitutionally applied to anyone, even to those whose conduct is not 
constitutionally privileged, unless the court can sever the unconstitu-
tional applications of the statute from the constitutionally permitted 
ones."46 Moreover, the argument goes, every occasion of invalidation 
results in judicial lawmaking through subtraction, and it has been this 
way since Marbury.47 In this excision-based view, severance is salvific: 
It saves the constitutional remainder of an unconstitutional law by 
41 It may, however, be necessary for a party to prior litigation holding the statute 
unconstitutional to seek modification of an injunction pursuant to Rule 60(b). FED. R. Civ. 
P. 60(b)(5); see also Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 239-40 (1997) (authorizing relief from 
permanent injunction limiting local educational officials' use of federal funds based on 
significant changes in Establishment Clause doctrine). 
42 Dorf, supra note 8, at 370. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id.; see also id. ("(Without severability,] any judicial decision finding any Jaw uncon-
stitutional, on its face or as applied, would call into question the entire legal code."). 
46 Dorf, supra note 26, at 238. 
47 See id. at 250 (describing Supreme Court's opinion in Marbury as applying "the same 
presumption of severability" as in Yazoo); cf Fallon, supra note 6, at 1337 n.91 ("Marbury 
provides an especially nice illustration of the extent to which constitutional practice pre-
supposes that statutory rules-understood as linguistic units-can and should be treated as 
comprising severable subrules."). 
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treating the unconstitutional portion "as if it were a distinct unconsti-
tutional provision."48 
The excision-based understanding of judicial review provides a 
powerful, internally coherent account of constitutional adjudication in 
the United States. This understanding does have one descriptive 
weakness: It requires attribution of implicit severance on a massive 
scale. But this weakness is minor-such attribution does not contra-
dict anything the Court has done and is consistent with the under-
standing of at least some Justices.49 
The principal problem with excision is not descriptive but pre-
scriptive: Excision requires deployment of a destructive doctrine that 
is subject to manipulation because of the counterfactual speculation 
that it requires. 
C. Problems with Severability and Excision 
Despite its potency, severability doctrine often evades scrutiny by 
remaining in the shadows of the substantive constitutional rulings that 
occasion its application. Those who have trained their lights on the 
doctrine, however, have been almost uniformly critical of what they 
have seen. 
Robert Stern wrote the seminal article on severability in 1937.50 
Frustrated by the Supreme Court's complete invalidation of partially 
unconstitutional New Deal economic legislation, Stern sought to bring 
order to a doctrine that he diagnosed as riddled with contradiction.51 
Yet Stern could find no organizing principles behind the doctrine, and 
he concluded that the Court's severability reasoning simply rational-
ized results reached on other grounds (such as preferred outcomes).52 
This criticism has never satisfactorily been answered. But as the Court 
showed greater receptivity to New Deal legislation as a matter of sub-
stantive constitutional law, the pressure on severability doctrine 
abated.53 
48 Dorf, supra note 26, at 250. 
49 See supra note 27. 
50 Stem, supra note 15. 
51 Id. at 78 ("Only if the apparent inconsistencies in Supreme Court decisions [dealing 
with the severability of statutes] are exposed and explained, as they have not been by the 
Court itself, can a conscious effort be made to formulate understandable and sensible prin-
ciples for the future."). 
52 Id. at 101-02 ("[T]he Court avails itself of one [severability] formula or another in 
order to justify results which seem to it to be desirable for other reasons."). 
53 See Shumsky, supra note 15, at 240 ("Since 1936, ... severability questions seem to 
have mostly faded into the background-perhaps as a consequence of the Court's willing-
ness to accept the constitutionality of most New Deal-style regulatory legislation."). 
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While the shift in substantive law diverted scholarly attention to 
other matters, the doctrine stayed the same for the next several 
decades, warts and all. Evaluating severability doctrine in the rnid-
1990s, Mark Movsesian observed: 
[Severability doctrine] has drawn criticism on almost every conceiv-
able basis. Commentators have condemned [it] as too malleable and 
as too rigid; as encouraging judicial overreaching and as encour-
aging judicial abdication. They have criticized the doctrine's 
reliance on legislative intent and its disregard of legislative intent; 
its excessive attention to political concerns and its inattention to 
political concerns .... 54 
Though these criticisms obviously reflect differing evaluations, they 
share the common characteristic of dissatisfaction with existing sever-
ability doctrine. Recent scholarship has continued in this same critical 
vein.55 
The most recent spur to critical evaluation of severability doctrine 
is the Court's audacious use of that doctrine in United States v. 
Booker.56 Justice Breyer's remedial opinion for the Court used sever-
ability doctrine to render the Federal Sentencing Guidelines non-
mandatory by "severing" and "excising" two statutory provisions from 
the Sentencing Act.57 The effect was to make the Guidelines advisory 
in all federal sentencing even though mandatory Guidelines would be 
54 Movsesian, supra note 15, at 41-42 (internal citations omitted). 
55 See, e.g., David H. Gans, Severability as Judicial Lawmaking, 76 GEO. WASH. L. 
REv. 639, 663 (2008) ("[Severability doctrine] gives courts extensive power to rewrite stat-
utes ... in a way that makes after-the-fact legislative correction unlikely[,] ... warps legis-
latures' incentives to obey constitutional norms ex ante[,) [and) allows courts to make 
vague law without thinking about it."); Nagle, supra note 15, at 225 ("The confusion sur-
rounding presumptions and the absence of a consistent effort to explain how severability 
fits within broader theories of judicial review and statutory construction has left all of the 
various tests used over the years unanchored by a principled approach."); Emily L. 
Sherwin, Rules and Judicial Review, in 6 LEGAL THEORY 299, 308 (2000) (arguing that 
existing doctrine inadequately accounts for "the effect of severance and related practices in 
establishing new rules, and the relative competence of courts and legislatures to perform 
the rulemaking function"). 
56 543 U.S. 220, 259 (2005). 
57 Id. Justice Breyer first inquired whether Congress would have preferred federal 
sentencing with the Sixth Amendment jury requirement engrafted onto the current system, 
or instead would have preferred no determinate sentencing scheme at all. Id. at 249. He 
concluded that "Congress would likely have preferred the total invalidation of the Act to 
an Act with the Court's Sixth Amendment requirement engrafted onto it." Id. Next, he 
asked whether some remedy short of complete invalidation would both solve the constitu-
tional problem and also be consistent with legislative intent, concluding that "Congress 
would likely have preferred the excision of some of the Act, namely the Act's mandatory 
language, to the invalidation of the entire Act." Id. The Court accordingly "sever[ed] and 
excise[d]" the provision that made the Guidelines mandatory, along with intertwined pro-
visions relating to appeal. Id. at 259. 
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unconstitutional in only some federal sentencing.58 The Booker 
remedy is a form of statutory cy pres-the judicial crafting of a new 
sentencing scheme that conforms as far as possible to hypothetical leg-
islative intent in light of the constitutional barrier to the implementa-
tion of the sentencing scheme that Congress actually enacted. As the 
Court must have recognized, and as the cases following Booker have 
borne out, the Booker remedy committed the federal judiciary to 
working out in a common law-like fashion the operational details of 
the new advisory Guidelines scheme wrought by the Court's sever-
ance and excision. 
Justice Breyer's opinion for the Court denied the dissenters' 
charges that it had created a new kind of severance analysis. 59 In a 
thorough analysis of the Booker remedy, Gillian Metzger similarly 
explains that, although "reasonable minds can[ ] and do[ ] differ" 
about whether "Congress would have preferred invalidation of [only] 
the Act's mandatory provisions to its total invalidation," these differ-
ences speak only to this specific application of severability doctrine, 
not to the legitimacy of using severability doctrine in general.60 
Metzger concludes that, "accepting arguendo the majority's reading of 
the Sentencing Act, its remedial approach of facial invalidation was 
perfectly legitimate."61 
Evaluated through this lens, the Booker remedy reveals how 
modern severability doctrine provides for a form of "backdoor" facial 
invalidation that depends not on constitutional command but on judi-
cially perceived counterfactual legislative intent. When a court uses 
application inseverability to invalidate all applications of a provision 
that is only unconstitutional in some applications, the effect is 
equivalent to a blanket "excision" of text that is only sometimes 
unconstitutional. And barring either a change in the underlying con-
stitutional rule or new legislation, the result is that the sometimes 
unconstitutional text may never be judicially enforced. 
58 Id. at 266-67. The remedy of making the Guidelines advisory in all federal sen-
tencing was not argued for by any party or amicus curiae. 
59 Compare id. at 247 (majority opinion), with id. at 283 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The 
precedent on which the Court relies is scant indeed."), and id. at 325 (Thomas, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that majority's remedial application of severability "constitute[s] legisla-
tion beyond [the Court's] judicial power"). 
60 Metzger, supra note 18, at 892 (quoting Booker, 543 U.S. at 248). Metzger grounds 
her defense of the Booker remedy in the principle of "application severability," arguing 
that "if a provision's unconstitutional applications cannot be severed or construed away, 
then ... [the] provision cannot be constitutionally applied at all .... " Id. at 892. According 
to Metzger, "application inseverability" supplies the source of judicial authority to invali-
date a statutory provision that is not facially unconstitutional. Id. 
61 Id. 
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This analysis of the Booker remedy also illustrates just how much 
lawmaking authority severability doctrine grants to a court. By 
reaching determinations about counterfactual legislative intent 
regarding a combination of applications and provisions, a court 
reviewing a partially unconstitutional statute can expand the scope of 
its invalidation as widely or as narrowly as it discerns to be consistent 
with hypothesized legislative intent. This authority to "excise" and 
"rewrite" is effectively discretionary because the legislative intent test 
is almost always indeterminate. The Court claims to discern what 
Congress would have intended had Congress known that its actual leg-
islation was unconstitutional as written. In Booker, the Court's con-
clusion regarding "what Congress would have intended in light of the 
Court's constitutional holding"62 looked very much like what the 
Court would have legislated had it possessed the authority to make 
sentencing policy as a legislator. 
It should come as no surprise that the Court's conclusion in 
Booker about what Congress would have wanted lines up closely with 
what five Justices think Congress should have wanted. And it is 
impossible to assail the outcome with evidence of what the enacting 
Congress did want because that Congress expressed no actual legisla-
tive intent regarding mandatory sentencing under the Apprendil 
Blakely line of cases.63 
This is not an isolated problem. Severability doctrine requires 
focus on hypothetical intent because there often is no actual, 
62 Booker, 543 U.S. at 246 (internal quotations omitted). 
63 Determinate federal sentencing based on binding guidelines promulgated by the 
United States Sentencing Commission resulted from the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. 
See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 367-68 (1989) {describing revisions to federal 
sentencing in 1984 Act). The Fifth and Sixth Amendment limitations on judicial factfinding 
that doomed the Guidelines in Booker began to emerge in the mid-to-late 1990s. See Jones 
v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 {1999) (arguing that under Fifth and Sixth 
Amendment limitations, "any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the max-
imum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt"); Douglas A. Berman, Examining the Blakely 
Earthquake and Its Aftershocks, 16 FED. SENT'G REP. 307, 307 (2004) ("[T]he constitu-
tional ground under sentencing reform had been rumbling for some time before the 
Blakely earthquake hit."). These limitations were given serious bite in Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), in which the Court held unconstitutional a New Jersey hate-
crime statute that provided for a sentencing enhancement based on judicial factfinding. 
But it was not until Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), that the principle under-
lying Apprendi was understood as a direct threat to the federal guidelines system. See 
Berman, supra, at 308 (explaining that Court's holding in Blakely came as surprise because 
"most observers believed [Blakely] was to serve as final confirmation that the Apprendi 
decision would not radically transform modern sentencing practices"). There is no way that 
the Congress that created the Guidelines system two decades earlier could have formed an 
intent about how the system should operate in light of the constitutional requirements 
identified in Blakely. 
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expressed legislative intent to be found.64 The hypothetical legislative 
intent test gets around this absence of any actual legislative intent to 
discern but does so by posing a question whose answer often calls for 
rank speculation.65 The inquiry "can perhaps be given some content 
by reference to legislative purpose, or to the 'enterprise' to which the 
statute belongs. But it can easily deteriorate into a question of what 
ought to happen, in which case 'legislative intent' adds nothing."66 
There is another problem. Suppose the hypothetical legislative 
intent approach yields an as-close-as-you-can-get-to-determinative 
conclusion that the legislature would not have enacted the legislation 
without its unconstitutional parts. Severability doctrine would then 
require total invalidation, even if the reason the legislature would not 
have enacted the legislation has nothing to do with either the constitu-
tional values or legitimate legislative objectives at issue. Suppose, for 
example, that swing votes for an important piece of reform legislation 
are bought through appropriations to a few legislators' states. Sup-
pose, further, that the appropriations are enacted as part of the same 
omnibus bill but are otherwise unrelated to the subject matter of the 
reform. If those appropriations are later held unconstitutional, and the 
legislature would not have enacted the statute without those vote-
buying payoffs, severability doctrine would require invalidation of the 
reform legislation. 
A concrete illustration of this potential problem can be found in 
the path through the federal courts followed by the Bipartisan 
Campaign Finance Reform Act ("BCRA"). In 2003, the BCRA sur-
vived a facial challenge in McConnell v. FEC.67 Five years later, the 
Court held that a BCRA provision whose constitutionality the Court 
did not adjudicate in McConnell-the so-called "Millionaires' 
64 As Emily Sherwin has observed, "severability questions are triggered by unplanned 
statutory failures." Sherwin, supra note 55, at 304; see also Stem, supra note 15, at 98 
("Difficult problems of statutory construction generally arise because the legislature has 
not thought of the particular situation which has come before the Court, and accordingly 
had no real intention as to how the law should be construed with respect to it."). The 
generalization about unplanned statutory failures does not always hold true, particularly 
with respect to legislation in fertile areas of constitutional litigation. But it holds often 
enough to assign the absence of forethought as one reason for the absence of actual intent. 
65 See, e.g., Sherwin, supra note 55, at 305 ("The difficulty here is that hypothetical 
intent is quite speculative."). 
66 Id. These criticisms are aimed not at the consideration of legislative intent in general, 
but at the counterfactual speculation required by modem severability doctrine in 
particular. 
67 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (upholding against facial First Amendment challenge various pro-
visions of Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 
81 (codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.) (regulating soft-money contributions and 
"electioneering communications")). 
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Amendment"-violated the First Amendment.68 Suppose it can be 
shown that Congress would not have enacted the BCRA absent the 
incumbency protection provided by the Millionaires' Amendment.69 If 
that supposition is correct, then the BCRA must fall in its entirety. 
While totally invalidating the BCRA based on severability doctrine 
after upholding it against a facial challenge might seem absurd, that is 
exactly what adherence to the hypothetical legislative intent test 
would require.70 The alternative is to fight the hypothetical and dis-
pute whether Congress would have enacted the BCRA without the 
Millionaires' Amendment. But that move only returns focus to the 
indeterminacy of the inquiry: Can anyone really know whether the 
BCRA would have passed without the Millionaires' Amendment? 
Should the continued existence of the entire legislative scheme for 
federal campaign financing turn on the answer to such a question? 
Would anyone be surprised if this question were asked of the Supreme 
Court, and the answers tracked the Justices' personal views about the 
constitutionality of the BCRA more generally?71 
Although Booker and the BCRA provide particularly vivid illus-
trations of the sweeping discretionary authority supplied by modem 
severance doctrine, the problems discussed above are not new, and 
severability doctrine has remained fundamentally unchanged since it 
was introduced over a century and a half ago. There is nothing much 
68 Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008). The Millionaires' Amendment relaxed contri-
bution limits for candidates running against opponents who spent significant sums of their 
own money in support of their candidacy. See id. at 2765-67 (describing how "Millionaires' 
Amendment" provision operated). The Court held that "imposing different contribution 
and coordinated party expenditure limits on candidates vying for the same seat is antithet-
ical to the First Amendment." Id. at 2774. 
69 But see Transcript of Oral Argument at 47-48, Davis, 554 U.S. _ (No. 07-340) 
(Solicitor Gen. Paul Clement) (arguing that Millionaires' Amendment is severable, relying 
in part on presence of severability clause); 34 Op. FEC 9 (2008) (concluding that personal 
loan provision in BCRA was severable from unconstitutional Millionaires' Amendment). 
70 A wrinkle in this argument is that some legislators who voted for the Millionaires' 
Amendment may have recognized the possibility that it was unconstitutional but voted to 
include it anyway in the belief that the statute's severability clause would prevent its 
unconstitutionality from bringing down the rest of the statute. Of course, this additional 
wrinkle just further exposes how difficult the project of discerning hypothetical legislative 
intent can be. 
71 Cf. Stern, supra note 15, at 113 ("(T]he judges who disapproved of the Jaw thought it 
was inseparable, while those who regarded it as constitutional also took a contrary position 
on the question of separability."). 
The Court's recent decision in Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), presents 
another opportunity for speculation about the BCRA's severability. Would Congress have 
enacted the legislation if it knew that it could not ban independent corporate spending on 
electioneering communications? What about the ban on electioneering communications as 
applied to others? Given the stakes of the answers to these questions and the indetermi-
nacy of the inquiry, perhaps the answers will depend on who one asks. 
Reprinted with ~ennission of New York University School of Law 
June 2010] PARTIAL UNCONSTITUTIONALITY 755 
to do about this state of affairs if modern severability doctrine is nec-
essary for "[any] workable system of judicial review."72 Must we just 
learn to live with it and tinker at the edges of the doctrine? If so, then 
observing the doctrine's unyielding endurance to sustained criticism 
would be an occasion for lamentation, but nothing more. 
The truth is that modern severability doctrine is not inevitable. 
We can have a functional system of judicial review without it. Indeed, 
the system would function better without it. The next Part aims to 
puncture the inevitability of modern severability doctrine through his-
torical analysis. Part III then fills the conceptual space opened up by 
the elimination of modern severability doctrine. 
II 
DocrRINAL HISTORY 
This Part presents the results of research into the original 
approach to partial unconstitutionality. It first identifies the concep-
tual foundations of the approach and then describes how the back-
ground principles for dealing with partial unconstitutionality operated 
across a range of areas of substantive constitutional law. This Part 
closes with a discussion of why the original approach to partial uncon-
stitutionality has not been previously noticed. 
A. Foundations of Repugnancy Displacement 
The recovery project begins with a fresh reading of Alexander 
Hamilton's exposition in Federalist No. 78, which Philip Hamburger 
describes as "an unusually elegant illustration of how lawyers tended 
to perceive the authority of the judges to expound the law, including 
the U.S. Constitution."73 According to Hamilton, "The judiciary ... 
has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction 
either of the strength or of the wealth of the society, and can take no 
active resolution whatever."74 The power of the judiciary is to enter 
judgments in cases.75 In reaching judgments, courts possess the 
authority "to pronounce legislative acts void, because contrary to the 
constitution .... "76 This authority derives from the Constitution's 
status as fundamental law and from judges' obligation "to regulate 
72 Dorf, supra note 8, at 370. 
73 PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DlJrY 552 (2008). 
74 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 378 (Alexander Hamilton) (Terence Ball ed., 2003). 
75 See id. ("It may truly be said to have neither Force nor Will, but merely judgment; 
and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its 
judgments.") (emphasis added). 
76 Id. at 379. 
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their decisions by the fundamental laws, rather than by those which 
are not fundamental."77 
The practice that Hamilton defended in Federalist No. 78 is not 
the same as the modem conception of "judicial review," in which 
courts "strike down" legislation. Rather, what we now call judicial 
review consisted of a refusal to give a statute effect as operative law in 
resolving a case. Hamilton described the practice of refusing to 
enforce an unconstitutional statute as an "exercise of judicial discre-
tion in determining between two contradictory laws .... "78 Because 
both the Constitution and statutes are law, it belongs to the courts to 
ascertain the meaning of each, and "(i]f there should happen to be an 
irreconcileable variance between the two, that which has the superior 
obligation and validity ought of course to be preferred . . . . "79 
Hamilton recognized that two laws could be totally or only partially 
contradictory,80 but he thought the same principle governed both 
cases: Courts should reconcile the laws to the extent possible and, 
where this cannot be done, "give effect to one, in exclusion of the 
other."81 The operative principle for Hamilton was not excision but 
displacement. 
According to Mary Sarah Bilder, "[w]hat contemporary scholars 
and the public call 'judicial review' originally had no such name. 
Indeed, until the early twentieth century, commentators identified it 
descriptively as courts voiding legislation repugnant to a constitu-
tion."82 Similarly, Philip Hamburger explains that what is now called 
judicial review was an implication of the nature of constitutions as law 
and the judicial duty "to decide in accord with the law of the land, 
including the constitution."83 
Other scholars have described American judicial review in its ori-
gins as requiring that Article III courts "refuse to enforce legislation 
that violates the Constitution. "84 Much of the evidence that these 
scholars rely on is also evidence of a shared presupposition that courts 
77 Id. at 380. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 379-80. 
BO See id. at 380 ("It not uncommonly happens, that there are two statutes existing at 
one time, clashing in whole or in part with each other, and neither of them containing any 
repealing clause or expression.") (emphasis added). 
81 Id. 
82 Mary Sarah Bilder, Idea or Practice: A Brief Historiography of Judicial Review, 20 J. 
PoL'Y HlsT. 6, 8 (2008). 
83 HAMBURGER, supra note 73, at 17. 
84 Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review, 70 U. Cttt. L. 
REv. 887, 914 (emphasis added); see also id. at 916 ("[V)indicating the people's choice of a 
limited Constitution requires judges to refuse to enforce unconstitutional statutes."); id. at 
955 ("Throughout the United States, dozens of speakers and writers made clear that 
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could and would engage in case-by-case displacement of unconstitu-
tional statutes.85 The displacement takes place by virtue of a rule of 
priority that requires application of superior law over inferior law to 
the extent there is a conflict between the two.86 
Viewed in this light, it is anachronistic to view Marbury as a case 
of implicit severance and excision. It is, instead, an instance of dis-
placement. The statutory grant of authority for the Supreme Court to 
issue writs of mandamus in the exercise of its original jurisdiction went 
beyond the Article III grant of original jurisdiction to the Supreme 
Court. As inferior law, the statutory grant was therefore unconstitu-
tional to the extent that it went beyond Article III, but no further. The 
Judiciary Act of 1789 was still "law" to the extent that it was not 
"void." The operative concept of judicial review here was one in 
which the Court, in disposing of the case before it, was obliged to 
apply the superior law of the Constitution in preference to conflicting, 
inferior statutory law: "If then the courts are to regard the constitu-
tion; and the constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legisla-
ture; the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case 
to which they both apply ."87 
B. Applications 
The concept of judicial review as refusal to give effect rather than 
"striking down" may seem weak. But experience from the first several 
decades of judicial review shows that the practice could be muscular 
and effective in ensuring the supremacy of the Constitution over con-
flicting laws. Operating within an intellectual framework in which 
judicial review consisted of a refusal to give effect to inferior law that 
judges, federal and state, could refuse to enforce legislation that transgressed the 
Constitution."). 
85 See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 78 (Max Farrand 
ed., rev. ed. 1937) (statement of Col. Mason) ("[I]f the Judges were joined in this check on 
the laws, ... they could impede in one case only, the operation of laws. They could declare 
an unconstitutional law void.") (emphasis added); BRurus XII (1788), reprinted in THE 
FEDERALIST WITH LETTERS OF "BRUTUS" 506, 508 (Terence Ball ed.) ("[T]he courts are 
vested with the supreme and uncontroulable power, to determine, in all cases that come 
before them, what the constitution means; they cannot therefore, execute a law, which, in 
their judgment, opposes the constitution, unless we can suppose they can make a superior 
law give way to an inferior.") (emphasis added). Although most of this evidence speaks to 
only the shared presupposition of case-by-case displacement of unconstitutional statutes, 
there are some statements that come closer to speaking to the issue of partial unconstitu-
tionality. For example, in congressional debates over the First Judiciary Act, Elbridge 
Gerry stated that "[t)he Constitution will undoubtedly be [the courts') first rule; and so far 
as your laws conform to that, they will attend to them, but no further." 1 ANNALS OF 
CoNG. 829 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (emphases added). 
86 See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text. 
87 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803) (emphasis added). 
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was repugnant to superior law, federal and state courts were able to 
vindicate the Contracts Clause,88 the Commerce Clause,89 and the 
Import-Export Clause,90 among other provisions, without massive dis-
placement of partially unconstitutional state laws. 
1. "Not the Terms of the Law But the Effect" 
Some of the clearest examples of the original approach to partial 
unconstitutionality appear in cases invalidating state legislation under 
the Contracts Clause.91 The doctrinal test applied in these cases often 
yielded application-specific holdings of unconstitutionality. These 
holdings operated in combination with the background principle that 
a statute may be void in part and valid in part to preserve challenged 
statutes except insofar as their application would be unconstitutional. 
That is, invalidity did not extend beyond unconstitutionality, and 
unconstitutionality was confined to a specific application or set of 
applications. The output of adjudication was not about the constitu-
tional validity of a statute in the abstract, but rather about the 
statute's constitutionality with respect to a particular application or 
class of applications. 
Golden v. Prince, an 1814 opinion by Justice Bushrod Washington 
riding circuit, is illustrative.92 A debtor invoked a Pennsylvania statute 
as discharging his debts in defense to suit for payment on a bill of 
exchange. The creditor responded that the statute was doubly uncon-
stitutional, first because the power to make bankruptcy laws was 
exclusively federal, and second because the state law impaired the 
obligation of contracts in violation of the Contracts Clause.93 Justice 
Washington ruled for the creditor on both grounds and, in so doing, 
explicitly differentiated the scope of the resulting statutory invalidity 
for each holding.94 
Close attention to the reasoning in this opinion provides three 
important insights into the operative understanding of partial uncon-
stitutionality. First, the function of judicial review was to determine 
88 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the 
Obligation of Contracts .... "). 
89 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes 
.... "). 
90 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2 ("No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, 
lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary 
for executing [its] inspection Laws .... "). 
91 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
92 10 F. Cas. 542 (C.C.D. Pa. 1814) (No. 5509). 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 547. 
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whether to recognize the challenged law as operative law in the case 
before the court. Justice Washington described the constitutional anal-
ysis as examining "whether the law relied upon by the defendant, to 
bar the present action, is repugnant to the constitution of the United 
States; and, on that account, is not to be regarded by the court, in this 
case[.]"95 
Second, statutory law could be unconstitutional on some occa-
sions but not others. This feature of Justice Washington's approach 
can be seen in the premise with which he began his Contracts Clause 
analysis: "[A] law may be unconstitutional, and of course void, in rela-
tion to particular cases; and yet valid to all intents and purposes, in its 
application to other cases within the scope of its provisions, but 
varying from the other in particular circumstances. "96 For instance, a 
debtor discharge statute is unconstitutional as applied to contracts 
entered into before the statute's enactment but not as applied to con-
tracts entered into after the statute's enactment.97 
Third, some constitutional defects can render a statute unconsti-
tutional in all circumstances. For instance, if the power to enact bank-
ruptcy laws is exclusively federal, and the state law is an exercise of 
that power, then the state law is unconstitutional in all applications.98 
With these principles framing his analysis, Washington first found 
the Pennsylvania statute unconstitutional as applied to the discharge 
of Prince's debt on the bill of exchange entered into prior to the law's 
passage.99 Next, Washington found the statute's bankruptcy legislation 
fully unconstitutional because the power to make bankruptcy laws was 
exclusively federal.100 The scope of statutory invalidity flowing from 
each flaw differed based on the scope of the invalidating principle of 
constitutional doctrine: "We are, upon the whole, of opinion, that the 
law under which the certificate is pleaded, in bar of the action, is 
altogether unconstitutional, for the reason last mentioned [i.e., that the 
95 Id. at 544 (emphasis added). 
96 Id. 
97 Id. According to Washington, "a law prospective in its operation, under which a 
contract afterwards made, may be avoided in a way different from that provided by the 
parties, would be clearly constitutional." Id. By contrast, "if the law act retrospectively, as 
to other contracts, so as to impair their obligation, the law is invalid; or in milder terms, it 
affords no rule of decision in these latter cases." Id. 
98 Id. at 545-47. 
99 Id. at 544 ("The question then is, whether a law of a state, which declares that a 
debtor, by delivering up his estate for the benefit of his creditors, shall be for ever dis-
charged from the payment of his debts, due or contracted before the passage of the law ... 
can be set up to bar the right of such creditor to recover his debt, either in a federal or state 
court? ... [I]t cannot; because the law is ... one which, in the case supposed, impairs the 
obligation of a contract."). 
100 Id. at 545-47. 
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power to enact bankruptcy legislation is exclusively federal]; and is so 
in reference to this debt, for the first reason [i.e., because it impaired 
the obligation of contracts]."101 
The Supreme Court confirmed Justice Washington's approach to 
partial unconstitutionality when it held in Sturges v. Crowninshield 
that the federal power to make uniform bankruptcy laws did not pre-
vent states from enacting their own debtor discharge laws in the 
absence of a conflicting federal bankruptcy statute.102 Notwith-
standing this holding recognizing state power, the Court held the law 
in Sturges unconstitutional with respect to the particular debt at 
issue.103 The Court could not apply the statute to the debt at issue 
because that debt had been contracted for before the discharge statute 
was enacted.104 
The idea that a statute can be unconstitutional with respect to a 
particular debt or class of debts, but otherwise valid, rested on the 
application of a doctrinal test that looked to statutory effects rather 
than statutory language. The opinions of Justices Trimble, 
Washington, and Thompson in the Supreme Court's fractured 4-3 
decision in Ogden v. Saunders reveal how this is so.105 The analysis in 
Justice Trimble's opinion106-his only signed opinion in a constitu-
101 Id. at 547. 
102 17 U.S. 122, 208 (1819). 
103 Id. ("[The Act], so far as it attempts to discharge this defendant from the debt in the 
declaration mentioned, is contrary to the constitution of the United States, and ... the plea 
is no bar to the action.") (emphasis added). The Court's certificate sending the case back 
down to the lower court also contains language explicitly delineating the scope of the 
Court's holding: 
CERTIFICATE .... [T]his Court is of opinion, that, since the adoption of the 
constitution of the United States, a State has authority to pass a bankrupt law, 
provided such law does not impair the obligation of contracts, within the 
meaning of the constitution, and provided there be no act of Congress in force 
to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy, conflicting with such law. This 
Court is farther of opinion, that the act of New-York, which is pleaded in this 
case, so far as it attempts to discharge the contract on which this suit was insti-
tuted, is a law impairing the obligation of contracts within the meaning of the 
constitution of the United States, and that the plea of the defendant is not a 
good and sufficient bar of the plaintiffs action. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
104 Id. at 197-98. 
10s 25 U.S. 213 (1827). 
106 According to David P. Currie, "Ogden was the only constitutional case in thirty-four 
years in which Marshall signed a dissent, and he took Story and Duvall with him." DAVID 
P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION JN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 
1789-1888, at 151 (1985). 
The Court addressed two issues in Ogden. The first was left open in Sturges-whether 
a state debtor discharge law violated the Contracts Clause as applied to a contract entered 
into after the statute had been enacted. See Ogden, 25 U.S. at 254 (stating that "whether 
the obligation of a contract is impaired by a State bankrupt or insolvent law, which dis-
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tional case107-is the most explicit: 
It is not the terms of the law, but its effect, that is inhibited by the 
constitution. A law may be in part constitutional, and in part uncon-
stitutional. It may, when applied to a given case, produce an effect 
which is prohibited by the constitution; but it may not, when applied 
to a case differently circumstanced, produce such prohibited effect. 
Whether the law under consideration, in its effects and operation 
upon the contract sued on in this case, be a law impairing the obli-
gation of this contract, is the only necessary inquiry.108 
761 
Justice Thompson's and Justice Washington's opinions also 
exhibit two important operative principles: (1) the Constitution is con-
cerned with effects and not words, and (2) a statute may be void in 
part and valid in part. Wrote Justice Thompson: "It was not denied on 
the argument, and, I presume, cannot be, but that a law may be void 
in part and good in part; ... it may be void, so far as it has a retrospec-
tive application to past contracts, and valid, as applied prospectively 
to future contracts."109 Similarly, Justice Washington commented: 
"[W]hich ever way we turn, ... we are met by this overruling and 
admitted distinction, between those which operate retrospectively, 
and those which operate prospectively. In all of them, the law is pro-
nounced to be void in the first class of cases, and not so in the 
second. "110 
charges ... liability under a contract entered into in that State after the passage of the act" 
is a question that "has never before been distinctly presented to the consideration of this 
Court, and decided"). On this issue, the Court ruled that prospective application of a 
debtor discharge law did not impair the obligation of a contract. Id. at 368-69 (Johnson, 
J.). The second issue related to territorial limits on legislative jurisdiction. On this issue, 
Justice Johnson joined the three dissenters from the Court's disposition of the first issue 
and held that the New York debtor discharge Jaw could not constitutionally be applied to 
the detriment of Saunders, a citizen of Kentucky who had "never voluntarily subjected 
himself to [New York's] laws, otherwise than by the origin of his contract." Id. at 358. 
Justice Johnson summarized the differential effect of these conclusions on the validity of 
the New York debtor discharge Jaw: "[A]s between citizens of the same State, a discharge 
of a bankrupt by the Jaws of that State, is valid as it affects posterior contracts; [and] as 
against creditors, citizens of other States, it is invalid as to all contracts." Id. at 368-69. 
101 CURRIE, supra note 106, at 194-95 (1985) ("When we attempt to analyze the work of 
individual Justices, the most striking fact is that most of Marshall's brethren were nearly 
invisible .... Trimble wrote once, for himself alone, to uphold the prospective bankruptcy 
Jaw."). 
108 Ogden, 25 U.S. at 316. 
109 Id. at 295 (Johnson, J.). 
no Id. at 262 (Washington, J.). The Court applied the distinction between retrospective 
and prospective application when assessing Contracts Clause challenges not only to debtor 
discharge Jaws, but also to other types of statutes. In Bronson v. Kinzie, for example, the 
Court held invalid an Illinois mortgage moratorium law that limited the remedies available 
to a lender as applied to mortgages entered into prior to the law's passage. 42 U.S. (1 
How.) 311, 320-22 (1843). The Court's opinion explicitly recognized that the law could be 
applied constitutionally to mortgages entered into after the statute's enactment. Id. at 321. 
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2. "To the Extent of Such Collision and Repugnancy" 
The Court did not limit the foregoing principles shaping its 
approach to partial unconstitutionality to the Contracts Clause alone. 
When the Marshall Court's Commerce Clause and Import-Export 
Clause doctrines ran up against the exercise of state powers 
addressing the same subject matter as federal law, the same principles 
of partial unconstitutionality greased the gears of the federal machine 
to keep it running. Two pairs of cases-each consisting of a Marshall 
opinion followed by an opinion by Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw for the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court-illustrate this point. 
The first pair of cases, Gibbons v. Ogden 111 and Norris v. 
Boston,112 addresses the distribution of power to regulate interstate 
commerce. Gibbons provided an application-specific framework for 
analyzing displacement of state law by federal law, which the later 
decision in Norris relied upon in elaborating its approach to the 
problem of partial unconstitutionality. Rather than decide the 
momentous question that consumed much of the argument in 
Gibbons-whether the states possessed a concurrent power to regu-
late interstate commerce-Marshall rested his decision on the actual 
existing conflict between the federal statute under which Gibbons had 
obtained his license and the grant of exclusivity resulting from New 
York state statutes.113 The Court asked "whether the laws of 
New-York, as expounded by the highest tribunal of that State, have, in 
their application to this case, come into collision with an act of 
Relatedly, in Woodruftv. Trapnall, the Court partially invalidated legislation that repealed 
a provision of the charter of the Bank of Arkansas providing that its notes would be 
accepted in payment of public debts. 51 U.S. (1 How.) 190, 207 (1851). This legislation 
impaired the obligation of contracts with respect to bank notes issued before the repeal, 
but was valid with respect to bank notes issued after. See id. at 206. ("That the state had the 
right to repeal the above section may be admitted. And the emissions of the bank subse-
quently are without the guaranty. But the notes in circulation at the time of the repeal are 
not affected by it."). Again, in each of these cases, statutory invalidity meant that the 
statute would not be given effect with respect to certain circumstances, not that the act was 
itself invalid. See id. at 207 ("The power of the legislature to repeal the section, the stock of 
the bank being owned by the state, is not controverted; but that act cannot affect the notes 
in circulation at the time of the repeal."). 
ll1 22 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
112 45 Mass. (1 Met.) 282 (1842). 
113 Gibbons was the owner of two steamboats which he operated as ferries between 
New York City and Elizabethtown, New Jersey, pursuant to a federal license that per-
mitted him to engage in the "coasting trade." Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 2. Ogden possessed the 
exclusive right under New York law to operate steamboat service on New York waters; he 
had been assigned this right by Robert Fulton and Robert Livingston, who had received it 
from a succession of New York statutes. Id. at 1-2. Ogden sued in New York state court for 
an injunction to enforce his exclusive right, and he obtained a permanent injunction, which 
he successfully defended on appeal within the New York system. Id. at 1-3. The Supreme 
Court heard Gibbons's appeal. Id. at 3. 
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Congress, and deprived a citizen of a right to which that act entitles 
him."114 
In Norris v. Boston, Massachusetts Chief Justice Shaw combined 
this application-specific approach with the background principle that a 
statute may be valid in part and void in part. Norris was an assumpsit 
action to recover money paid under a Massachusetts law placing a per 
capita tax on foreign passengers brought by ship into Massachusetts 
ports.115 En route to denying recovery on the ground that the statute 
was not repugnant to the Constitution, Chief Justice Shaw framed the 
applicable test (which he drew from Gibbons) as providing that "if the 
specific means [adopted by state and federal law] do not conflict with 
each other, both may stand and operate together, though they operate 
at the same time, upon the same subjects. "116 If there is any conflict, 
the state statute is void to the extent of the conflict but no further: 
This act having been passed in due form, and received the sanction 
of all branches of the legislature, ... is valid and binding, unless it 
comes in conflict with the constitution of the United States or some 
114 Id. at 210 (emphasis added). This focus obviated the question of concurrent power 
because "[s]hould this collision exist, it will be immaterial whether [New York's] laws were 
passed in virtue of a concurrent power 'to regulate commerce with foreign nations and 
among the several States,' or in virtue of a power to regulate their domestic trade and 
police." Id. According to the Court, "[t]he real and sole question seems to be, whether a 
steam machine, in actual use, deprives a vessel of the privileges conferred by a license" 
issued under a 1793 federal statute regulating the coasting trade. Id. at 219. The Court 
concluded that "the act of a State inhibiting the use [of its waters or entering ports] to any 
vessel having a license under the act of Congress, comes ... in direct collision with [the 
federal] act." Id. at 221. The Court's holding, therefore, was that "so much of the laws of 
the State of New York, as prohibits vessels licensed according to the laws of the United 
States, from navigating the waters of the State of New York, by means of fire or steam, is 
repugnant to the said constitution, and void." Id. at 240 (emphases added). 
115 45 Mass., at 282. The Supreme Court reversed the Norris decision, which it decided 
together with Smith v. Turner, a similar New York case, in the Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (1 
How.) 283 (1849). But the Court's reasoning in reversal did not call into question Shaw's 
reasoning regarding partial unconstitutionality. In fact, the arguments of counsel and the 
opinions of the Justices in the Passenger Cases reveal the same provision-specific approach 
to partial unconstitutionality taken by Chief Justice Shaw. Section 3 of the statute at issue 
in Norris contained the invalid tax provision, while Section 1 authorized the boarding of 
ships for inspection, and Section 2 authorized the port city to require payment of a $1000 
bond for "any lunatic, idiot, maimed, aged, or infirm person" as security against such indi-
viduals becoming "a city, town, or State charge" after landing. Id. at 409. The Court's 
constitutional reasoning invalidated only Section 3. Id. at 410. Indeed, both Justice Grier 
(in the majority) and Justice Taney (in dissent) explicitly stated that Massachusetts's power 
under Section 2 was not in question in the case. See id. at 456-57 (Grier, J.); id. at 469 
(Taney, J., dissenting). The Court took a similarly narrow approach in Smith v. Turner, the 
companion New York case. Id. at 283. Smith was a challenge to certain sections in a New 
York statute requiring the payment by ship captains of a per capita tax on foreign passen-
gers brought into the Port of the City of New York. Id. at 284. The Court's invalidation of 
the tax was limited to these sections and did not affect the other sections. Id. at 572. 
116 Id. at 294. 
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law made in pursuance of its enumerated powers. If it be in any 
respect repugnant thereto, to that extent it is inoperative and void; 
because the constitution of the United States, and all laws and trea-
ties made in pursuance of the powers vested in the general govern-
ment, are the supreme law of the land. But an act of the State 
legislature is no further void, than as its provisions are thus repugnant 
to the constitution or laws of the United States; and consequently the 
same act may be valid in part and void in part.117 
This approach to partial unconstitutionality limited the relevant 
inquiry for judicial review to the constitutionality of the specific provi-
sion giving rise to the claimed constitutional defect.118 This limitation 
arose from the fact that it was only this constitutional question whose 
resolution was necessary to the assumpsit action in Norris. 119 
A second pair of cases, this time involving the Import-Export 
Clause, illuminates the original approach to partial unconstitutionality 
through another one-two combination of (i) a landmark Marshall 
decision on federal-state authority, followed by (ii) a later Shaw deci-
sion applying the Marshall decision. In Brown v. Maryland, Chief 
Justice Marshall formulated the "original package" doctrine to imple-
ment the Import-Export Clause.12° This doctrine divided federal and 
state authority depending on whether "the importer has so acted upon 
the thing imported, that ... it has perhaps, lost its distinctive character 
as an import, and has become subject to the taxing power of the State 
"121 
117 Id. at 287-88 (emphases added). 
118 See id. at 288. ("The question therefore in the present case, is, not whether some 
single provision may not be found in this act, which may conflict with the law of the United 
States, but whether the provision requiring the master or agent of a vessel, arriving within 
the limits of the State, with alien passengers on board, liable to become chargeable to the 
State, to pay two dollars for each of such passengers, before he can be permitted to land 
them, conflicts with that law."). 
119 Norris, 45 U.S. at 284. 
120 25 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 419, 441-42 (1827). In Brown, the Court reviewed the constitu-
tionality of a license requirement for liquor importers and wholesalers who were prose-
cuted for selling without a license. Id. at 436. The challenged license requirement was an 
amendment to a statute that had previously required only retailers to pay duties. Id. at 450 
(Thompson, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court invalidated the 
importer/wholesaler license requirement, which functioned as a tax on imports, while 
leaving the retailer licensing scheme intact. Id. at 459. This holding depended on the 
Court's identification of the point at which the constitutional prohibition on state taxation 
of imports no longer prevented the states from levying a tax on goods that had previously 
been imported. Chief Justice Marshall reasoned that "when the importer has so acted upon 
the thing imported, that it has become incorporate and mixed up with the mass of property 
in the country, it has perhaps lost its distinctive character as an import, and has become 
subject to the taxing power of the State; but while remaining the property of the importer, 
in his warehouse, in the original form or package in which it was imported, a tax upon it is 
too plainly a duty on imports to escape the prohibition in the constitution." Id. at 441-42. 
121 Id. at 441-42. 
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Ten years later, Chief Justice Shaw applied this doctrine in 
Commonwealth v. Kimball, in which an individual sought to overturn 
his conviction for unlicensed retailing of spirituous liquors.122 Kimball 
argued that the Massachusetts law prohibiting such sales was an 
unconstitutional state regulation of interstate commerce and an 
unconstitutional duty on imports.123 The court rejected both 
arguments.124 
Shaw's analysis rejecting Kimball's Import-Export Clause claim 
provides an example of how the original approach to partial unconsti-
tutionality accommodated laws that by their terms could reach more 
broadly than constitutionally permissible but that in their application 
were within state power. Kimball argued that the license requirement 
was unconstitutional because "the prohibition to sell is general, and 
makes no distinction between the cases of a sale by the importer of 
imported spirits, in the original packages ... and the sale of spirits not 
imported, or not by the importer, or not in the original packages."125 
Shaw rejected this argument in two steps. First, he noted that the 
unconstitutionality of certain applications of the state law would have 
no effect on its constitutionality in other applications.126 Second, he 
observed that there was no proof that the law as applied to Kimball 
was being used to penalize the sale of imported liquor.127 Because 
122 41 Mass. (1 Pick.) 359, 361-62 (1837). 
123 Id. at 361. 
124 Id. at 363. Addressing the Commerce Clause argument first, Shaw described the 
challenged law as a health and welfare regulation, which the state could permissibly 
enforce except to the extent that it "shall happen, in any particular instance, to come 
directly in conflict with the operation of some law of the United States made in pursuance 
of its enumerated powers." Id. at 361. In the case of such a conflict, the Supremacy Clause 
dictates that "to the extent of such collision and repugnancy, the law of the State must 
yield, and to that extent and no further, it is rendered by such repugnancy, inoperative and 
void." Id. Such a conflict "is not to be presumed, but ... must be clearly shown and 
established." Id. at 365. Kimball proved no such conflict-he failed to show that the law 
regulating retail sales of spirituous liquors would impede federal law-and he therefore 
lost on this challenge. Id. 
125 Id. at 362. 
126 See id. ("Supposing the law could be construed to be repugnant to the constitution of 
the United States, in so far as it prohibited the sale of imported spirits by the importer in 
the original package, it would be void thus far and no further, and in all other respects 
conforming to the acknowledged power of the State government, it would be in full 
force."). Elaborating on this reasoning, Shaw stated further that "[w]hether legal enact-
ments, some of which it is competent for the legislature to make, and others not, are con-
tained in the same or in different sections of a statute, can make no difference." Id. The 
reason is that "it is not the defect of form, but of power, that invalidates any of them; it is, 
therefore, the subject matter, and not the arrangement of the language in which it is 
embodied, that is to be regarded in deciding whether any provision is constitutional or 
not." Id. 
127 Id. ("If ... the defendant had offered to show in his defence, that the spirits charged 
to have been illegally sold by [the defendant], without license, contrary to the statute, were 
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Kimball made no such showing, his challenge failed. 128 In other words, 
Shaw limited judicial review by looking to the constitutionality of 
state power as actually exercised under the statute, rather than by 
looking to the terms of the statute on their own. 
The application-specific operation of judicial review in the fore-
going cases depended on background principles of partial unconstitu-
tionality. These principles contributed to a working federalism by 
limiting the scope of constitutional adjudication. By virtue of the dis-
placement approach used in these cases, a state statute would remain 
valid and enforceable except to the extent that its application con-
flicted with federal law. Unlike modem decisions, as-applied adjudica-
tion did not depend on implicit or explicit satisfaction of a test for 
severability. Conversely, no inseverability argument was advanced to 
expand the scope of adjudication beyond the specific application or 
applications giving rise to the claim of unconstitutionality. 
3. Occasions of Inseverability 
A final pair of cases illustrates the distance between the earlier 
approach to partial unconstitutionality and the modem conception of 
what situations provide occasions for inseverability analysis. The con-
trast between an 1845 tax case and the Court's inseverability-based 
invalidation of the federal income tax in 1895 reveals the substantial 
shift in constitutional adjudication that modern severance doctrine 
enabled. 
In the 1845 case Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court, the Court partially 
invalidated a general tax on banks that operated in some circum-
stances in violation of the Contracts Clause.129 Gordon involved a 
bank tax that did not by its terms distinguish between banks whose 
charters exempted them from increased taxation and those whose 
charters did not.130 The Court invalidated the statute as applied to 
banks whose charters exempted them from increased taxation while 
explicitly recognizing and preserving the statute's applicability to non-
exempted banks.131 Neither the Court nor any of the banks suggested 
imported by himself, and sold in the original package, it would then have given rise to the 
question which has been mainly argued in the present case."). 
128 Id. 
129 44 U.S. (1 How.) 133, 149-50 (1845). 
130 Id. at 144. 
131 Id. at 150; see also State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 57 U.S. (1 How.) 369 (1853) (invali-
dating statutory tax increase applied to banks whose charter, under prior act, provided for 
lower rates); Planters' Bank v. Sharp, 47 U.S. (1 How.) 301 (1848) (invalidating state 
restrictions on negotiability of bank notes because prior act required that they be negoti-
able). Because the doctrinal test for invalidity under the Contracts Clause at the time 
looked only at specific contracts at issue, the extent of invalidity in Knoop was limited to 
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that the unconstitutionality of certain applications of the law could 
also result in the invalidity of the law in its constitutional applications 
through the use of inseverability reasoning. 
The absence of such inseverability arguments from Gordon is 
uninteresting given the then-prevailing approach to partial unconstitu-
tionality, but it is striking in comparison with the later decision in 
Pollock v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co.132 In this 1895 decision, the 
Supreme Court voted 5-4 to invalidate entirely the income tax por-
tions of an 1894 revenue act.133 The Court first held that the tax was 
unconstitutional insofar as it was based on income from both real and 
personal property.134 The Court next concluded that the remainder of 
the income tax was inseparable from the tax on income derived from 
real and personal property; thus, the income tax had to be struck 
down in its entirety.135 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Fuller rea-
soned that the holding of unconstitutionality regarding income 
derived from real and personal property would eliminate "by far the 
largest part of the anticipated revenue" from the income tax, leaving 
"the burden of the tax to be borne by professions, trades, employ-
ments, or vocations .... "136 Eliminating only the unconstitutional por-
tions of the income tax, then, would cause "what was intended as a tax 
on capital" to become instead "a tax on occupations and labor."137 
the statute's applications to only those contracts actually impaired: "[T]he tax law of 1851 
... impairs the obligation of the contract, which is prohibited by the Constitution of the 
United States, and, consequently, that the act of 1851, as regards the tax thus imposed, is 
void." Id. at 392 (emphasis added). Similar reasoning appears in Planters' Bank. See 47 
U.S. at 334 ("[T]he law under which this action has been abated must be considered as 
having impaired the obligation of contracts, and therefore to be in this respect unconstitu-
tional, and the judgment of the State court erroneous.") (emphasis added). 
132 158 U.S. 601 (1895). 
133 The Court heard argument twice in Pollock. Its first decision did not resolve the 
entire case because the Court was evenly divided on several questions. See Pollock v. 
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 586 (1895). In its first decision, the Court held 
that a tax on rents or incomes from real estate was unconstitutional. Id. But the Court was 
evenly divided on the remaining questions, which included: (1) whether the invalidity of 
the tax on rents and income from real property invalidated the whole act; (2) whether the 
tax on income derived from personal property was unconstitutional; and (3) whether any 
other parts of the income tax were unconstitutional. Id. Because the effect of an even 
division is to affirm the judgment below, which in this case had rejected the constitutional 
challenge in its entirety, the only portion of the law that was unconstitutional after the first 
decision was the income tax on rents and income from real estate. Id. The second decision 
is discussed in the text above. 
134 Pollock, 158 U.S. at 635. 
135 Id. at 637. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
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Because such a tax was not intended by Congress, the Court held that 
the income tax provisions had to fall in their entirety.138 
Discussing Pollock a few decades later, Robert Stem observed 
the close connection between the Justices' severability analyses and 
their views on the merits of the case: "The judges who disapproved of 
the law thought it was inseparable, while those who regarded it as 
constitutional also took a contrary position on the question of separa-
bility. "139 By that time, Stem was working within the legislative-intent 
approach to severability, however, so he did not appreciate just how 
far the Court's reasoning departed from its earlier approach to partial 
unconstitutionality. Under that earlier approach, the idea that the 
resulting relative tax burden from a holding of partial unconstitution-
ality should be a factor in the Court's consideration of the validity of 
the income tax as a whole was, quite literally, inconceivable. 
C. The Stealthy Rise of Modern Severability Doctrine 
The foregoing cases reveal an internally coherent, trans-
substantive approach to the problem of partial unconstitutionality. 
The cases are not idiosyncratic but instead are part of a general frame-
work applied in both state and federal courts for several decades prior 
to the rise of severability doctrine. A basic principle governed: 
Statutes are invalid so far as they are repugnant to superior law, but 
no further.140 
Why has this original approach to partial unconstitutionality lan-
guished in obscurity? One reason is framing. Rather than view partial 
138 Id. 
139 Stern, supra note 15, at 113. 
140 Although I have not undertaken to research the approach to partially unconstitu-
tional (or otherwise partially invalid} statutes before Marbury, the limited evidence that I 
have come across is consistent with the approach described above. See Hutchins v. Player, 
(1663) 124 Eng. Rep. 585, 610 (C.P.) ("[T]hat part of the act which concerns pitching cloths 
at Blackwell Hall, and the hallage, is purely distinct, and hath no relation to that part of the 
act which concerns the factors; and, therefore, the one part, as I conceive, shall not vitiate 
the other. And this construction of the act, as it is agreeable with common reason, that 
what is good shall not be vitiated by what is bad, so it is also agreeable with the reason of 
the law."); JOSEPH HENRY SMrrn, APPEALS TO THE PRIVY COUNCIL FROM THE AMERICAN 
PLANTATIONS 628 (1950) (reporting on 1760 opinion by two crown law officers that "the 
King in Council lacked the power to disallow in part Pennsylvania acts," but that "there 
may be cases in which particular provisions may be void ab initio though other parts of the 
law may be valid, as in clauses where any act of Parliament may be contraversed or any 
legal right of a private subject bound without his consent"); 1 JOHN STRANGE, REPORTS OF 
ADJUDGED CASES IN THE COURTS OF CHANCERY, KING'S BENCH, COMMON PLEAS, AND 
ExcHEOUER 469 (London, A. Strahan & W. Woodfall 1795) ("There is no doubt but a by-
law may be good in part, and void for the rest; for where it consists of several particulars, it 
is to all purposes as several by-laws, though the provisions are thrown together under the 
form of one." (reporting on Fazakerley v. Wiltshire, {1716) 88 Eng. Rep. 754 (K.B.))); see 
also HAMBURGER, LAw AND JumcIAL DUTY 262 n.11 (citing cases). 
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unconstitutionality as a phenomenon in its own right, Stern's founda-
tional scholarship took severability doctrine as a given, traced it back 
to its origins, and dismissed the earlier framework by observing that 
"[t]he problem of separability, as we know it today, was not recog-
nized" in those earlier years.141 That approach made sense for Stem; 
he sought to bring order to the modern doctrine, not discard it. 
The problem from this framing comes in the shift from Stern's 
position142 to the more recent claim that "[s]everability doctrine has 
been with us since the beginnings of judicial review."143 This anachro-
nistic attribution of implicit severability all the way back to Marbury 
accommodates that case within the now-prevailing excision-based 
approach, but it obscures the original displacement-based approach 
that Marbury actually exemplifies. 
Another reason for the obscurity of the original approach is that 
the background principles informing the original approach to partial 
unconstitutionality were so uncontroversial that they did their work 
without much discussion in the Court's opinions. Severability doctrine 
now has a name and can easily be identified. By contrast, the back-
ground principles regarding partial unconstitutionality in the first sev-
eral decades of judicial review were not grouped together in their own 
named doctrinal category. Nobody argued against these principles. As 
a result, the identification of partial unconstitutionality as a problem 
for analysis in its own right did not occur until after the modern 
intent-based approach to severability emerged. 
In 1854, Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw of the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court delivered an opinion in Warren v. Mayor & 
Aldermen of Charlestown144 that Stern credits as the first decision to 
hold, on the basis of legislative intent, that the invalid parts of a 
statute could nullify the statute in its entirety.145 This doctrinal innova-
141 Stern, supra note 15, at 79. Stern's use of "separability" rather than "severability" 
reflected the more prevalent usage when Stern wrote in 1937. The terms are understood 
today to be interchangeable. See Fallon, supra note 6, at 1331 n.55 ("The terms 'severable' 
and 'separable,' and 'severability' and 'separability,' are treated as synonymous by the 
courts and in the literature .... "). 
142 Stern, supra note 15, at 79. 
143 Gans, supra note 55, at 639; see also Dorf, supra note 26, at 250 (describing Court's 
opinion in Marbury as applying "the same presumption of severability" as in Yazao ); 
Shumsky, supra note 15, at 232 (describing Marbury as reflecting "early assumption that 
partially unconstitutional statutes were to be severed"). 
144 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 84, 94 (1854). 
145 Stern, supra note 15, at 79-80. It turns out that Warren was not, as Stern thought, the 
first decision to use a legislative intent test to hold "that the invalid parts of a law might 
nullify the remainder." Id. Others have followed Stern's error on this point. See, e.g., 
Nagle, supra note 15, at 212; Shumsky, supra note 15, at 233. In actuality, the Arkansas 
Supreme Court decided two cases before Warren, one in 1851 and another in 1853, in 
which the court relied on legislative intent to conclude that statutes' unconstitutional parts 
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tion was to provide a way for a court to hold entirely invalid a statute 
that was only partially unconstitutional, based on judicial perception 
of whether the legislature would have enacted the statute absent its 
unconstitutional parts. Stern summarized the legislative-intent test of 
Warren as follows: 
[I]f constitutional and unconstitutional portions of a statute [are] 'so 
mutually connected with and dependent on each other ... as to 
warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and 
that, if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not 
pass the residue independently' the entire statute must fall.146 
Stern's summary accurately captures the manner in which Warren 
rendered severability dependent on legislative intent. But Stern did 
not explain from where Shaw drew this test. A clue comes from the 
omission in Stem's quotation: The omitted language in the quote 
required the reviewing court to determine whether the unconstitu-
tional and constitutional parts of the challenged statute were depen-
dent on each other "as conditions, considerations or compensations 
for each other. "147 As Mark Movsesian has explained, "Chief Justice 
Shaw's reference in Warren to 'conditions, considerations, or compen-
sations' is significant. These, of course, are basic concepts of contracts 
law."148 In Warren, then, Shaw rendered statutory severability depen-
dent on a legislative intent-based test drawn from contract law, appar-
ently based on the implicit assumption that a statute is "a bargain 
among the legislators who enacted it. "149 The limiting principle, in 
Movsesian's words, is that a "court could not sever a provision so cen-
tral as to amount to 'consideration' for the statute's passage."150 Shaw 
thus advanced a new approach to partial unconstitutionality through 
his Warren decision. 
Although Shaw's development of a contract law-inspired, intent-
based test for severability marked a shift from the earlier approach to 
partial unconstitutionality, the shift was subtle. The legislative-intent 
limitation attributed to Warren did not spring fully formed from Chief 
were inseparable from their constitutional parts, requiring invalidation of the entire stat-
utes. See Washington v. State, 13 Ark. 752, 763-64 (1853) (invalidating billiards licensing 
scheme); Eason v. State, 11 Ark. 481, 501-03 (1851) (invalidating act expanding jurisdic-
tion of justices of peace). But there is no point in getting hung up on figuring out precisely 
what was first in time: The Arkansas cases proved to be less influential than Warren, which 
appears first in eminence if not in time; and any other earlier cases had to have been even 
less influential than the Arkansas cases. 
146 Stern, supra note 15, at 80 (quoting Warren, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) at 99). 
147 Warren, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) at 99. 
148 Movsesian, supra note 15, at 62. 
149 Id. 
1so Id. 
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Justice Shaw's mind but was prefigured by earlier formulations that 
were susceptible to transmutation into the legislative-intent approach. 
These formulations appeared in cases that applied a "void in part, 
valid in remainder" rule of decision, but did so in a way that presaged 
the future legislative-intent limitation. 
Clark v. Ellis, an 1826 decision of the Indiana Supreme Court, 
supplies one such formulation. 151 The issue in Clark was whether an 
assault-and-battery prosecution was within the jurisdiction of the jus-
tice of the peace who had held the trial and delivered the sentence.152 
An Indiana statute vested justices of the peace with jurisdiction to 
preside over jury trials for assaults and batteries in cases resulting in 
fines of no more than twenty dollars.153 But the Indiana Constitution 
limited the justice of the peace's jurisdiction to certain cases resulting 
in fines of no more than three dollars.154 The court held that the jus-
tice of the peace acted within his constitutional jurisdiction because 
the decision giving rise to the constitutional challenge had resulted in 
a fine of three dollars.155 In explaining why the exercise of jurisdiction 
in that case was constitutional even though the terms of the statutory 
grant exceeded the constitutional limitation, the court stated that "a 
part of an act of assembly being unconstitutional, does not affect a 
constitutional part of the same act relative to the same subject."156 
Had the court stopped with this statement, there would have been 
little in Clark for transmutation into modern severability doctrine. 
But the court continued: "That part which is unconstitutional, is con-
sidered as if stricken out of the act; and if enough remains to be intelli-
gibly acted upon, it is considered as the law of the land."157 It is but a 
short step from this idea that the unconstitutional part "is considered 
as if stricken out of the act" to the modern notion that judges should 
look to legislative intent to determine whether to excise provisions 
from statutes. 
Another early state case, Campbell v. Mississippi Union Bank, 
also illustrates how the original displacement approach was suscep-
151 2 Blackf. 8 (Ind. 1826). 
152 Id. at 9. Clark was not itself the prosecution but apparently a defamation action that 
followed that prosecution. Id. at 8-9. The plaintiff, Clark, had testified against Ellis before 
the justice of the peace, and Ellis accused Clark of committing perjury. Id. at 9. Clark then 
sued Ellis, and one of the elements of Clark's cause of action required showing that Eilis's 
accusations "were spoken with reference to a swearing" in the trial before the justice of the 
peace. Id. Ellis demurred on the ground that the proceeding before the justice of the peace 
was outside of the latter's jurisdiction. Id. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 9-10. 
156 Id. at 10. 
157 Id. 
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tible to transmutation into the modem intent-based excision 
approach.158 In discussing the relationship between two acts passed at 
different times (the latter of which was supplemental to the first one), 
the court explained that a previous valid act could not be destroyed by 
a subsequent void one.159 Said the court: "If one be void the other will 
not be affected, unless they be so essentially connected and blended 
together as to make one useless and inoperative without the other."160 
By introducing a qualification to the general principle that "[i]f one be 
void the other will not be affected," this decision presages modem 
severability doctrine's intent-based test. Admittedly, modem sever-
ability doctrine goes beyond asking whether what remains would be 
"useless and inoperative" to inquiring into the hypothetical intent of 
the enacting legislature. But the fact that Campbell conceptualizes the 
"useless and inoperative" remainder as a qualification of the general 
principle of void only so far as repugnant-rather than as an indepen-
dent reason why the remainder could not be enforced as law-reveals 
the short conceptual distance between the earlier approach to partial 
constitutionality and modern severability doctrine. 
In any event, the novelty of Chief Justice Shaw's invocation of 
legislative intent as a test for severability was not recognized at the 
time it was introduced, or even in the immediately following decades. 
Thomas Cooley, in the 1868 first edition of his influential treatise, 
matter-of-factly included a legislative intent-based test for sever-
ability in his discussion of partial unconstitutionality, supported with 
an impressive citation of approximately two dozen cases (only some of 
which actually used the legislative-intent approach).161 Cooley's reci-
tation of the legislative intent approach portrayed it as seamlessly con-
tinuous with what preceded it, which effectively buried the earlier 
approach to partial unconstitutionality. 
A comparison of the first (1857)162 and second (1874)163 editions 
of Theodore Sedgwick's A Treatise on the Rules Which Govern the 
158 7 Miss. (6 Howard) 625 (Err. & App. 1842). 
159 Id. at 676-77. 
160 Id. at 677. 
161 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH 
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 177-81 
(1st ed. Boston, Little, Brown 1868). 
162 THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE 
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1st ed. 
New York, Voorhies 1857). Born to a prominent American family in 1811, Sedgwick was a 
New York lawyer who authored a treatise on damages in addition to this treatise on inter-
pretation. THE y ALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW 487-88 (Roger K. 
Newman, ed., 2009). 
163 THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRE-
TATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (John Norton Porn-
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Interpretation and Application of Statutory and Constitutional Law 
reveals the quickness and stealth of the incorporation of the legislative 
intent test into constitutional adjudication. 
The first edition of Sedgwick's treatise states: "The principle that 
a statute is void only so far as its provisions are repugnant to the con-
stitution, that one provision may thus be void and this not affect other 
provisions of the statute, has been frequently declared."164 In addi-
tion, Sedgwick block-quotes an 1854 decision of the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court authored by Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw: 
'The principle is now well understood,' says the Supreme Court of 
the State of Massachusetts, 'that where a statute has been passed by 
the legislature under all the forms and sanctions requisite to the 
making of laws, some part of which is not within the competency of 
the legislative power, or is repugnant to any provision of the consti-
tution, such part thereof will be adjudged void and of no avail; 
whilst all other parts of the act, not obnoxious to the same objec-
tion, will be held valid and have the force of law. There is nothing 
inconsistent in declaring one part of the same statute valid and 
another part void.'165 
That is the entirety of Sedgwick's discussion: one sentence stating 
a general principle followed by a block quote from Chief Justice Shaw. 
There is no mention of "separability," "severability," or "severance," 
nor qualifications of this general principle. 
Although Sedgwick's description is spare, three features are 
worth noting. First, the only function of the principle that "void in one 
part does not mean void in any other parts" is to limit the scope of 
judicial invalidation. Because of this principle, the taint of unconstitu-
eroy ed., 2d ed. New York, Baker, Voorhies 1874). Pomeroy was a professor at the New 
York University School of Law and the Hastings School of Law, as well as a prolific trea-
tise writer, editor, and case reporter, in the last third of the nineteenth century. See John C. 
Leary, John Norton Pomeroy 1828-1885: A Biographical Sketch, 47 L. LIBR. J. 138, 139-42 
(1954). 
164 SEDGWICK, supra note 162, at 489. Sedgwick's authorities were: Ely v. Thompson, 10 
Ky. (3 A.K. Marsh) 70 (1820); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); Clark v. 
Ellis, 2 Blackf. 8 (Ind. 1826); City of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837); 
Commonwealth v. Kimball, 41 Mass. (24 Pick.) 359 (1837); Edwards v. Pope, 4 Ill. (3 
Scam.) 465 (1842); Norris v. Boston, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 282 (1842); and Fisher v. McGirr, 67 
Mass. (1 Gray) 1 (1854). But the profusion of case citations can be misleading. Sedgwick's 
cases are spread across two footnotes. For each footnote, the lead cited case contains the 
principle articulated by Sedgwick and then itself cites the other cases that appear in 
Sedgwick's footnotes. In effect, then, Sedgwick relied on two cases, Edwards for the first 
sentence and Fisher for the block quote. Id. 
165 SEDGWICK, supra note 162, at 489 (quoting Fisher, 67 Mass. (1 Gray) at 21-22). 
Although decided in the same year as Warren, Fisher preceded that watershed case. Fisher 
was decided in the Supreme Judicial Court's March 1854 term, while Warren was decided 
in the October 1854 term. See Fisher, 67 Mass. (1 Gray) at 1; Warren, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) at 
84. 
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tionality and consequent voidness attach only to the extent that the 
statute's individual terms and applications are unconstitutional. 
Second, this principle applies to a statute that "has been passed by the 
legislature under all the forms and sanctions requisite to the making of 
laws."166 Its application presupposes a statute that is properly in exis-
tence as law. The principle provides for the continued existence of 
some parts or provisions notwithstanding that other parts or provi-
sions are void. Third, the principle does not depend on legislative 
intent. 
Sedgwick's 1874 second edition retains the same text as the first 
edition but expands its discussion with an extensive note that discusses 
the "question" of separability and the doctrinal test for determining 
whether a statute is separable.167 In less than two decades, then, a 
brightline principle that an unconstitutional statutory provision has no 
effect on other constitutional provisions in the same statute was trans-
formed into a problem that only posed the "question" of separability 
to be resolved by application of a doctrinal test. The shift to legislative 
intent-based severability doctrine had already taken place. 
The Supreme Court handed down the next landmark decision for 
modern severability doctrine, United States v. Reese, 168 the following 
year. The doctrinal innovation in Reese was the Supreme Court's 
embrace of the understanding that, by enjoining only the unconstitu-
tional applications of a statute that has valid and invalid applications, 
a court may engage in forbidden judicial rewriting.169 Reese involved 
the federal prosecution of two municipal election inspectors in 
Kentucky for refusing to count the vote of William Garner, an African 
American.17° The Supreme Court upheld dismissal of the indictment 
on the ground that the statute the officials were charged with violating 
was not appropriate enforcement legislation under the Fifteenth 
Amendment.171 The Court recognized Congress's power to enact leg-
islation punishing interferences with voting by state officials on 
account of race but interpreted the statute to punish all interferences 
with voting, regardless of whether the interferences were on account 
of race.172 As thus interpreted, the statute was unconstitutional. It 
therefore could not form the basis of the indictments in Reese, even 
166 SEDGWICK, supra note 162, at 489 (quoting Fisher, 67 Mass. (1 Gray) at 21). 
167 SEDGWICK, supra note 163, at 413-15, 413-14 n.(a). 
168 92 U.S. 214 (1875). 
169 See id. at 221 ("The question, then, to be determined, is, whether we can introduce 
words of limitation into a penal statute so as to make it specific, when, as expressed, it is 
general only."). 
170 Id. at 215. 
171 Id. at 221-22. 
172 Id. at 218, 220. 
Reprinted with ~ennission of New York University School of Law 
June 2010] PARTIAL UNCONSTITUTIONALITY 775 
though those indictments charged the denial of an individual's right to 
vote on account of his race.173 The Court stated, "[w]e are not able to 
reject a part which is unconstitutional, and retain the remainder, 
because it is not possible to separate that which is unconstitutional, if 
there be any such, from that which is not. "174 This conclusion followed 
from the Court's earlier determination that "[i]f, taking the whole 
statute together, it is apparent that it was not the intention of 
Congress thus to limit the operation of the act, we cannot give it that 
effect. "175 
The link in Reese between this intent-focused approach to statu-
tory interpretation and the Court's conclusion as to inseparability was 
the Court's conception of judicial review. The Court reasoned that the 
"[t]he proposed effect is not to be attained by striking out or disre-
garding words ... , but by inserting those that are not now there."176 
Having framed the question as "whether [the Court] can introduce 
words of limitation into a penal statute so as to make it specific, when, 
as expressed, it is general only," the Court answered: "To limit this 
statute in the manner now asked for would be to make a new law, not 
to enforce an old one. This is no part of our duty."177 In short, the 
Court declined to apply severability reasoning on an application-by-
application basis here, stating that confining the statute to only its 
constitutional applications would have required the Court to write in 
words of limitation, which the Court took to be beyond the judicial 
power. 
The importance of Reese for our purposes lies not in its substan-
tive constitutional holding but in the fact that it equates the idea of 
giving effect to only the constitutional applications of a partially 
unconstitutional statute with "mak[ing] a new law."178 The Court has 
continued to rely on Reese's caution against "substitut[ing] the judicial 
for the legislative department of the government"179 through trim-
ming of a partially unconstitutional statute to leave only its constitu-
tional applications.180 In so doing, however, the Court has not 
173 Id. at 215. 
174 Reese, 92 U.S. at 221. 
175 Id. at 219. 
176 Id. at 221. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. 
180 See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 330 (2006) 
("[The Court is] wary of legislatures who would rely on our intervention .... ");City of 
Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 60 (1999) ("The Constitution does not permit a legislature 
to 'set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step 
inside and say who could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large."' (quoting 
Reese, 42 U.S. at 221)); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 884-85 n.49 (1997) (same). 
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reconciled that reliance with its 1960 decision in United States v. 
Raines, which adopted an approach to the constitutionality of enforce-
ment legislation opposite that of Reese .18 1 
In present times, the excision-based legislative-intent approach is 
so pervasive that West's Key system describes that approach as pre-
sent in the early nineteenth century even when it was not.182 And 
while the coverage of severability doctrine in treatises is heavy with 
case law, it is also uneven. For example, the 2001 sixth edition of 
Sutherland's statutory interpretation treatise continues to describe 
Reese as a "leading federal case"183 without any mention of the 
Court's rejection of Reese's approach to the constitutionality of fed-
eral enforcement legislation in Raines. The fact is that it has become 
difficult to conceive of judicial review in any way other than excision. 
* * * 
Because the excision-based legislative-intent approach is now so 
ingrained, it might be tempting to minimize the difference between 
that approach and the original displacement approach by describing 
the original approach in excision terms-for instance, by asserting that 
the original approach represents nothing more than a blanket rule of 
severability. This temptation should be avoided. Ignoring the distinc-
tive displacement-based framing of the original approach to partial 
unconstitutionality obscures the significant change in the conception 
of the judicial role that the transition from displacement to excision 
represents. Moreover, neglect of the displacement approach as an 
alternative to excision has resulted in a failure of scholars and judges 
to apprehend the distinctively destructive function of modern sever-
ance doctrine. 
This Article's recovery of the original displacement approach to 
partial unconstitutionality enables a before-and-after comparison that 
upends the dominant view that severability doctrine saves partially 
181 362 U.S. 17, 24 (1960) ("(T]o the extent Reese did depend on an approach inconsis· 
tent with what we think the better one and the one established by the weightiest of the 
subsequent cases, we cannot follow it here."); id. at 24-25 ("[I]f the complaint here called 
for an application of the statute clearly constitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment, 
that should have been an end to the question of constitutionality."). 
182 For example, the key-cited headnote for an 1826 state court decision that does not so 
much as mention legislative intent describes the case as if the reasoning and disposition on 
severability turned on it. See Clark v. Ellis, 2 Blackf. 8, 1826 WL 1078 (Ind. 1826) ("Statute 
may be valid in part and invalid in part, and invalid part may be disregarded, where the 
two parts are not so intimately connected as to raise presumption that Legislature would 
not have enacted one without other."). 
183 2 NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 608 
(6th ed. 2001). 
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unconstitutional statutes from total invalidity.184 Before severance 
doctrine emerged, displacement-based partial unconstitutionality doc-
trine was already doing precisely this. Prior to severability doctrine's 
rise, courts routinely held an unconstitutional law void to the extent of 
repugnancy, but no further; there was no "next step" in which courts 
inquired into whether the legislature would have preferred no law at 
all to the constitutional remainder. After severance emerged, partial 
unconstitutionality (now seen as resulting from excision, and not dis-
placement) became dependent on the satisfaction of a legislative-
intent test. The "next step" of a legislative-intent analysis injects into 
judicial review the possibility that invalidity extends beyond unconsti-
tutionality, which occurs whenever severability doctrine results in a 
holding of inseverability. In comparison with the original displace-
ment approach, the distinctive function of modern severability doc-
trine is to enable total invalidity to flow from partial 
unconstitutionality. Modern severability doctrine does not save; it 
destroys. 
III 
DISPLACEMENT 
Given that severability is not inevitable, and that existing doc-
trine is destructive and manipulable, the question arises: Is there a 
better way? There is, and it is easy to implement. This Part describes 
the approach of "displacement without inferred fallback law," 
explains why it is superior, identifies some of its limitations, and 
answers potential objections.185 
184 See Dorf, supra note 8, at 370 (arguing that, without severability, "any judicial deci-
sion finding any law unconstitutional, on its face or as applied, would call into question the 
entire legal code"); Metzger, supra note 18, at 887-88 ("If unconstitutional applications are 
not severed, the statute cannot be applied to any litigant, even one making no claim of 
constitutional protection for her conduct."). 
185 This Article does not advocate any particular theory of constitutional interpretation, 
such as originalism, nor does it argue that its proposed approach-displacement without 
inferred fallback law-should be adopted because it is more faithful to the original 
approach to partial unconstitutionality. The object of this Article is to retrieve a "useable 
past" through the study of a neglected aspect of our constitutional tradition. See Cass R. 
Sunstein, The Idea of a Useable Past, 95 CoLuM. L. REv. 601, 603 (1995) (describing idea 
of "useable past" as oriented to "the goal of finding elements in history that can be brought 
fruitfully to bear on current problems," and defending constitutional lawyers' search for a 
useable past as distinct from "mere advocacy" or "history lite"). The method is not simply 
to identify a discrete set of legal directives that can be ripped from the world of early- to 
mid-nineteenth-century constitutional adjudication and burned into existing doctrine. 
Instead, the method begins by trying to understand and appreciate how courts during that 
time dealt with a practical problem that remains today, although understood within a dif-
ferent conceptual framework. It continues by correlating the practical solution from that 
time period with the conceptual framework and doctrinal tools available in present times. 
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A. Displacement Without Inferred Fallback Law 
The alternative approach to partial unconstitutionality that I pro-
pose is displacement without inferred fallback law. This proposal (i) 
replaces the excision-based approach to judicial review with a dis-
placement-based approach, and (ii) limits the scope of displacement 
by prohibiting inferences about counterfactual legislative intent used 
to invalidate beyond the required displacement. Under this displace-
ment-based approach, judicial review is an exercise in determining the 
extent to which superior law displaces inferior law. Judicial review 
calls for an "exercise of judicial discretion, in determining between 
two contradictory laws."186 Within this displacement approach, the 
reviewing court does nothing to the inferior law except refuse to rec-
ognize it as enforceable law in resolving the particular case before it. 
A helpful way to think about the move from excision to displace-
ment is as the shift from a statute-minus approach to a statute-plus 
approach. Laurence Tribe described the contrast between these two 
approaches in his analysis of the Court's invalidation and severance of 
the legislative veto in Chadha:187 
Rather than conceiving of the court as enforcing the law 'minus' its 
invalidated provision-a law the legislature never enacted-per-
haps one should simply understand the court as resolving the 
controversy before it in terms of the entire body of law applicable to 
that controversy, the entire Act of Congress (not the Act 'minus' 
any offending portion) plus the Constitution.188 
Tribe describes this approach in passing as "the theory of 
Marbury v. Madison," 189 but does not elaborate further. Moreover, I 
have found no scholarship or modem judicial opinion that has explic-
itly developed the statute-plus approach beyond Tribe's identification 
of it in his analysis of Chadha. As the elaboration of the original 
approach to partial unconstitutionality in Part II has revealed, how-
Additionally, although the proposed approach to partial unconstitutionality includes a 
textualist approach to statutory interpretation, its adoption does not require the adoption 
of textualism more generally. Even nontextualists may conclude that the use of imaginary 
reconstruction for deciding what to do with partially unconstitutional statutes should be 
abandoned for reasons specific to the particular context of discerning hypothetical intent 
regarding partial unconstitutionality. As matters now stand, however, the disjunction 
between textualism and severability doctrine runs in the other direction. See Caleb E. 
Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REv. 347, 404-05 (2005) (explaining that 
"[t]extualist judges regularly join opinions" that use "a species of imaginative reconstruc-
tion" to answer questions of severability). 
186 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 380 (Alexander Hamilton) (Terence Bell ed., 2003). 
187 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
188 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 81-82 (1985). 
189 Id. at 318 n.116. 
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ever, this statute-plus approach does indeed reflect "the theory of 
Marbury v. Madison."190 
Under this proposed displacement approach, the combination of 
four basic background principles drawn from the original approach to 
partial unconstitutionality will generally cause the scope of displace-
ment to be coextensive with the scope of unconstitutionality. First, the 
function of judicial review should be to determine what law governs in 
the course of resolving a particular case. More specifically, judicial 
review should be conceived of as the process of determining whether, 
and, if so, to what extent, the Constitution supersedes otherwise oper-
ative law in resolving the particular case before the court.191 Second, 
upon recognition of a conflict, superior law must displace inferior law, 
which is thereby deemed void.192 Third, a law may be void in part and 
valid in part, and the voidness of one part has no effect on the validity 
of the other parts.193 Fourth, a law is void to the extent of its conflict 
with the Constitution, but no further. 194 
Nothing in these principles rules out the possibility of facial inval-
idation flowing from application of substantive constitutional law. The 
application of some constitutional tests results in a holding that the 
challenged statute is completely invalid.195 Recall, for instance, Justice 
Bushrod Washington's holding in Golden v. Prince that a state debtor-
relief law was "altogether unconstitutional" because the power to 
190 Id. 
191 See, e.g., Golden v. Prince, 10 F. Cas. 542, 544 (C.C.D. Pa. 1814) (No. 5509) (framing 
issue as whether contested law "is repugnant to the constitution ... and, on that account, is 
not to be regarded by the court, in this case"). 
192 See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1Cranch)137, 178 (1803) (describing resolu-
tion of conflicting law as "very essence of judicial duty"). 
193 E.g., SEDGWICK, supra note 162, at 489. 
194 E.g., Norris v. Boston, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 282, 287-88 (1842). A narrow qualifier on 
this principle is that the remainder will not survive as enforceable law if it is incapable of 
functioning independently of the unconstitutional provision or provisions of a statute. This 
qualifier states something of a truism, but is worth noting nonetheless. Its presence in case 
law predates the advent of the legislative intent-based approach to severability. See, e.g., 
Clark v. Ellis, 2 Blackf. 8, 10 (Ind. 1826) ("That part which is unconstitutional, is consid-
ered as if stricken out of the act; and if enough remains to be intelligibly acted upon, it is 
considered as the law of the land."). The same qualifier is present in current law, although 
it is now understood in legislative intent-based terms. See, e.g., Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. 
Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987) ("Congress could not have intended a constitutionally 
flawed provision to be severed from the remainder of the statute if the balance of the 
legislation is incapable of functioning independently."). This qualifier states a very narrow 
limitation on the principle of "void to the extent of repugnancy, but no further." The test is 
not whether the remainder would function in the manner intended by the legislature, but 
whether the remainder is capable of functioning at all. 
195 See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 6, at 1338 (describing doctrinal tests that result in facial 
invalidation, such as "purpose" tests and "suspect-content" tests). 
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make bankruptcy laws was exclusively federal. 196 In such a circum-
stance, there is no resulting partial unconstitutionality and no need for 
a court to adopt any particular approach to partially unconstitutional 
statutes.197 
Just as there is nothing that forecloses facial invalidation as a 
matter of constitutional law, there is nothing in the displacement 
approach that would foreclose the legislature from enacting, in 
advance of invalidation, fallback law that dictates what effect partial 
unconstitutionality will have on the remainder of the statute. For 
example, the legislature could link provisions with an inseverability 
clause, so that they stand or fall together.198 Absent some constitu-
tional defect with the inseverability clause itself, the two linked provi-
sions would live or die as a single unit even under the displacement 
approach with no inferred fallback law. Alternatively, the legislature 
could explicitly provide for some other type of fallback law, such as a 
provision to be substituted in place of one found to be invalid.199 
When the legislature actually provides for such fallback law, the scope 
of displacement will not be coextensive with the scope of unconstitu-
tionality but will instead depend on what the legislature has actually 
provided. 
196 Golden, 10 F. Cas. at 547. 
197 This is actually not always true. To be more precise, even when a challenged statute 
is held facially invalid because the applicable test of substantive constitutional law requires 
such a holding, it may be necessary to invoke some approach to partial unconstitutionality 
to limit the spillover effects of the constitutional holding. For example, the Child Online 
Protection Act held facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment in ACLU v. 
Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181, 207 (3d Cir. 2008), was not a stand-alone statute but Title XIV of 
an omnibus appropriations bill. See Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998). The First 
Amendment defects that required facial invalidation of the Child Online Protection Act 
had no effect on the other fifty-two titles in the omnibus bill. 
198 See generally Friedman, supra note 23, at 909-17 (examining distinctive features of 
inseverability clauses). Unlike an inseverability clause or a substitute provision, a sever-
ability clause would yield the same result as the absence of any fallback law. For that 
reason, severability clauses are superfluous under my proposed approach. However, sever-
ability clauses will not be superfluous as long as courts addressing questions of partial 
unconstitutionality continue to adopt the current approach of imaginative reconstruction 
for severability questions. As long as inferences of inseverability or of some other type of 
fallback law are permitted, severability clauses can serve to forestall those inferences and 
are therefore not superfluous. 
199 For example, the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act contained a "'backup' 
definition of 'electioneering communication,' which would become effective if the primary 
definition were 'held to be constitutionally insufficient by final judicial decision to support 
the regulation provided herein."' McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 190 n.73 (quoting 2 
U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(ii)). Similarly, the statute at issue in Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 
(1986), contained a "fallback" provision to take effect if a certain statutory provision were 
held invalid. Id. at 735 (holding that "fallback" provisions in Balanced Budget and 
Emergency Deficit Control Act were effective after statute was held unconstitutional). 
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Because a displacement approach allows the legislature to pro-
vide for fallback law, it must be linked with an approach to statutory 
interpretation for determining whether the legislature has in fact pro-
vided such fallback law. When looking for fallback law, the limit 
imposed by my proposed approach is that a court should not ask what 
the legislature would have done with respect to fallback law, only 
what it actually did with respect to fallback law. In other words, the 
court must be persuaded that the legislature actually legislated a 
fallback provision before engaging in anything other than simple 
displacement. 
For several reasons discussed in the next section, this Article pro-
poses a clear statement requirement for legislating fallback law. 
Before turning to that discussion, however, this exposition of how the 
proposed approach would operate concludes with an example that 
illustrates how displacement without inferred fallback law would have 
required a different outcome than existing severability doctrine in a 
recent, high-profile decision. In addition to explaining how my pro-
posed approach would function, this example also suggests some of 
the advantages and disadvantages of displacement without inferred 
fallback law. 
Bismullah v. Gates200 was a proceeding brought by detainees 
seeking release from Guantanamo Bay pursuant to the procedure set 
forth in the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA)-a federal statute 
enacted in the wake of the Supreme Court's holding in Rasul v. 
Bush201 that statutory jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus 
extended to Guantanamo Bay. The DTA eliminated habeas review 
for noncitizens held at Guantanamo Bay202 and put in its place a 
system of military review by Combatant Status Review Tribunals 
(CSRTs) followed by review in the D.C. Circuit.203 
In the Supreme Court's first encounter with the DTA, in Hamdan 
v. Rumsfeld,204 it held that Congress did not intend the elimination of 
habeas corpus review to apply retroactively to cases that had been 
filed prior to the enactment of the DTA. Congress responded to 
Hamdan with the Military Commissions Act (MCA), which elimi-
nated habeas corpus review again and made clear that this elimination 
extended to all habeas corpus petitions on behalf of noncitizens held 
200 551 F.3d 1068 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
201 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004). 
202 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 1405(e)(l), 119 Stat. 3136, 
3477 (2006) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006)). 
203 Id. § 1405(e)(2) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 801 (2006)). 
204 548 U.S. 557, 584 (2006). 
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at Guantanamo Bay, including those filed before the enactment of the 
DTA and the MCA.2os 
In Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme Court held that the MCA's 
elimination of habeas corpus review for Guantanamo Bay detainees 
violated the Suspension Clause.206 In the wake of Boumediene, gov-
ernment lawyers faced a two-front battle: The first front was review by 
CSRTs followed by the D.C. Circuit, as authorized by Congress in the 
DTA; the second was habeas review pursuant to procedures that had 
yet to be defined, as opened up by the Court in Boumediene. Con-
fronted by this daunting prospect of dual proceedings, and having 
suffered additional setbacks with respect to the scope of DTA review, 
government lawyers developed an inseverability-based escape argu-
ment. They argued that Congress did not intend for the judiciary to 
undertake DTA review-the only form of judicial review that 
Congress had authorized-except as a replacement for habeas corpus 
review eliminated in the same statute.207 A unanimous panel of the 
D.C. Circuit agreed.208 This tactic successfully terminated the DTA 
review process, in which the detainees had made substantial inroads 
against the government, and consigned the detainees to exclusive reli-
ance on a habeas process whose contours were still a work in progress. 
The D.C. Circuit's decision in Bismullah reveals a conventional 
application of existing severability doctrine.209 The court found that 
"the text of the relevant provisions and the enactment of successive 
jurisdiction-stripping provisions demonstrate clearly that the Congress 
would not in the DTA have given [the D.C. Circuit Court] jurisdiction 
to review CSRT determinations had it known its attempt to remove 
the courts' jurisdiction over habeas petitions would fail."210 According 
to the panel opinion, the "basic objective" of the DTA was "to restrict 
205 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7, 120 Stat. 2600, 2635-36 
(2006) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)), invalidated by Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 
2229 (2008). 
206 128 S. Ct. at 2274. 
201 See Bismullah v. Gates, 551 F.3d 1068, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ("(T]he Government 
argues the Congress did not intend OTA§ 1005(e)(2), which gave this court alone jurisdic-
tion to review CSRT determinations, to stand apart from the section of the Military 
Commissions Act (MCA) that provides no court shall have jurisdiction to hear a detainee's 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus .... "). 
208 Id. at 1075 ("(W]e are confident the Congress would not have enacted 
DTA § 1005(e)(2) in the absence of the statutory provision banning the courts from exer-
cising jurisdiction over a detainee's habeas petition. Because the latter provision has been 
held unconstitutional, the former must also fall."). 
209 See id. at 1070 ("If it is evident the Congress would not have enacted one statutory 
provision had it known that another provision would be held unconstitutional, then the 
former provision cannot be severed from the latter, and the two provisions must fall 
together."). 
210 Id. at 1072. 
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judicial review of the Executive's detention of persons designated 
enemy combatants."211 In light of this understanding of Congress's 
objective, the court concluded that Congress "undoubtedly" would 
not have enacted the jurisdiction-granting provision of the DTA (for 
D.C. Circuit review of CSRT determinations) had it known that its 
attempt to eliminate habeas review would be held unconstitutional. 
The court reasoned that congressional creation of "an additional and 
largely duplicative process by which a detainee could challenge his 
detention in the court of appeals" is inconsistent with the basic objec-
tive of limiting detainee access to the courts.212 
The D.C. Circuit's elimination of DTA review appears unobjec-
tionable in its application of the existing approach to partial unconsti-
tutionality. Relying on declarations filed by the Directors of the CIA 
and the FBI, the court noted that litigation resulting from detainees' 
pursuit of parallel avenues of review would "be duplicative and 
[would] greatly burden the Government's capacity to produce sensi-
tive evidence."213 
Although the D.C. Circuit's imaginary reconstruction of 
Congress's intent in creating DTA review did not rest on far-fetched 
speculation, the decision nevertheless remains troubling. The problem 
lies less in the ultimate result of eliminating duplicative proceedings 
than in the way in which the government achieved this result-by 
petitioning the judiciary rather than working through the politically 
accountable branches. While government lawyers shouldered a heavy 
burden in defending parallel claims, judicial lightening of this burden 
forestalled the need for legislative accomplishment of the same task 
and further centralized the formulation of detainee review policy in 
the judicial branch. By eliminating the only form of detainee review 
authorized by Congress, the court left as the only avenue for detainee 
review the adjudication of habeas corpus petitions pursuant to proce-
dures to be defined by the judiciary. 
The D.C. Circuit could not have accomplished this result under 
the proposed approach of displacement without inferred fallback law. 
Instead, under this approach, the court would have inquired only 
whether DTA review was itself constitutional and could function inde-
pendently of the unconstitutional elimination of habeas. The Supreme 
Court's decision in Boumediene that DTA review was not an adequate 
substitute for habeas does not, of course, imply that DTA review is 
itself unconstitutional. Indeed, as the detainees' counsel pointed out 
211 Id. 
212 Bismullah, 551 F.3d at 1075. 
213 Id. at 1074. 
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to the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme Court's opinion in Boumediene 
expressly stated that "the DTA ... process [remains] intact."214 As the 
government argued and the D.C. Circuit agreed, the Supreme Court 
included this statement in Boumediene to identify "the limited extent 
of its constitutional holding" and make it "as clear as possible that it 
was not holding the review provisions of the DTA unconstitu-
tional."215 Moreover, there is no question that the DTA review provi-
sion was "capable of functioning independently" of the invalid 
provision, which eliminated habeas review for detainees at 
Guantanamo Bay.216 My proposed approach would have required that 
DTA review be left in place in the absence of explicit legislative direc-
tion (which Congress had not, to that point, provided). 
As reflection on the foregoing example suggests, my proposed 
approach has both benefits and drawbacks. The next section outlines 
some advantages of that approach, while the third and final section 
considers qualifications and objections. 
B. Why Displacement Without Inferred Fallback Law Is Better 
The "without inferred fallback law" part of the proposed dis-
placement approach functions as a clear-statement requirement for 
the legislature to express its intent for a holding of partial unconstitu-
tionality to result in anything but simple displacement. The virtues of 
a clear statement rule for severability doctrine have been elaborated 
previously by John Copeland Nagle, Mark Movsesian, and Michael 
Shumsky-all of whom presupposed an excision-based framework for 
judicial review.217 The clear statement aspect of my proposed dis-
placement approach is functionally equivalent to theirs, and to that 
extent shares its virtues: It is easy for courts to implement, it is consis-
tent with past legislative and judicial practice, and it provides a clear 
rule against which the legislature can act. On top of these beneficial 
features, the switch from excision to displacement provides the addi-
tional advantages of explanatory simplicity and avoidance of judicial 
lawmaking. 
214 Id. at 1071 (quoting Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2275) (internal quotations omitted). 
215 Id. 
216 Id. ("The parties do not dispute that the first and second requirements for sever-
ability are met-that is, DTA § 1005(e)(2) is constitutional and could function 
independently."). 
217 See Movsesian, supra note 15, at 73-82 (recommending textual interpretation 
approach to severability of statutory provisions); Nagle, supra note 15, at 232-46 (arguing 
that general principles of statutory construction should be used to interpret severability); 
Shumsky, supra note 15, at 272-75 (arguing for applying clear statement rule to question of 
severability). 
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To begin with, the displacement without inferred fallback law 
approach is easy for the judiciary to implement in any specific case. 
Take, for example, the question of what should happen to increased 
hard-money contribution limits if an accompanying ban on soft-
money contributions within the same statute is held unconstitutional. 
Unless Congress explicitly provides in statutory text that the two 
should stand or fall together, the displacement approach forbids a 
court to do anything to the hard-money contribution limits. However, 
if Congress does explicitly link the two provisions, then the insever-
ability clause linking them is enforceable just like any other law 
(assuming it has no constitutional defects itself). Thus, if Congress did 
include an inseverability clause, the unconstitutionality of the soft-
money ban would result in the elimination of the increased hard-
money contribution limits as wen.21s 
In addition to ease of implementation, the displacement without 
inferred fallback law approach is generally consistent with past judi-
cial practice. As set out in Part II, it is consistent with the original 
approach to partial unconstitutionality. And while displacement 
without inferred fallback law does break from the current excision-
based conception of judicial review, its impact on case outcomes 
would not be significant in a quantitative sense. The only outcomes 
that would change are those in which courts reached a holding of 
inferred inseverability under the current excision-based approach. 
Booker is the only Supreme Court decision in recent years in this cat-
egory.219 The last Supreme Court holding of inferred inseverability of 
a federal law prior to Booker was the 1982 decision in Northern 
Pipeline v. Marathon Pipe Line.220 And to find a Supreme Court 
218 For an analysis of this specific issue that yields the same result as my analysis here, 
but by different means, see Shumsky, supra note 15, at 228-31 (noting that Court would 
look to legislative intent to determine severability of McCain-Feingold soft-money ban sec-
tion from rest of campaign finance reform bill). 
219 The Supreme Court applied a legislative intent test to hold an Executive Order 
inseverable in Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 190-94 
(1999). The Court did not offer much reasoning to support its application of a legislative 
intent approach to determining the severability of an Executive Order. See id. at 191 
("Because no party before this Court challenges the applicability of [statutory severability] 
standards, for purposes of this case we shall assume, arguendo, that the severability stan-
dard for statutes also applies to Executive Orders."). 
220 458 U.S. 50, 87 n.40 (1982). The Court stated: 
Id. 
We cannot conclude that, if Congress were aware that the grant of jurisdiction 
could not constitutionally encompass this [state law contract claim] and similar 
claims, it would simply remove the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court over 
these matters, leaving the jurisdictional provision and adjudicatory structure 
intact with respect to other types of claims, and thus subject to Art. III consti-
tutional challenge on a claim-by-claim basis. 
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holding of inferred inseverability of a federal law prior to Northern 
Pipeline, it is necessary to go all the way back to the New Deal.221 
Inference-based invalidation is similarly rare in state systems.222 
Many modern Supreme Court decisions holding federal laws par-
tially unconstitutional are fully consistent with the displacement 
without inferred fallback law approach.223 Additionally, every 
instance of as-applied adjudication to which the excision approach 
attributes implicit severance analysis is consistent with the displace-
ment without inferred fallback law approach. 
There are a number of cases that use standard severability rea-
soning to reach outcomes consistent with my proposed displacement 
approach. For this category of cases, shifting to the proposed displace-
ment method would eliminate the case-by-case, provision-by-
provision analysis that characterizes existing doctrine. If there were 
reason to believe that the search for legislative intent outside of 
explicit fallback law would actually prove fruitful in such cases, the 
loss of accuracy would count against the displacement approach as a 
cost of the change. But there is no persuasive reason to believe that 
this is so. To the contrary, preference-driven manipulation of sever-
ability doctrine by the judiciary is an acknowledged problem.224 
221 See Nagle, supra note 15, at 220 ("The Supreme Court has not invalidated an entire 
federal statute as nonseverable since the 1930s."). This statement excludes Northern 
Pipeline, presumably because it treats the unit of analysis as the entire statute-in that 
case, the Bankruptcy Act of 1978. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 
458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982). The holding of inseverability in Northern Pipeline was of application 
inseverability of a statutory provision, as in Booker. See id. 
The last major burst of commentary and analysis surrounding severability doctrine 
occurred in the wake of the Court's 1983 invalidation of the legislative veto in INS v. 
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). The circuits split on the severability of the legislative veto 
contained in the Reorganization Act. Compare EEOC v. CBS, Inc., 743 F.2d 969, 973 (2d 
Cir. 1984) (finding legislative veto inseverable), with EEOC v. Hernando Bank, Inc., 724 
F.2d 1188, 1192 (5th Cir. 1984) (finding legislative veto provision severable), and Muller 
Optical Co. v. EEOC, 743 F.2d 380, 388 (6th Cir. 1984) (same). The Supreme Court held 
the legislative veto severable in both cases that squarely addressed the question. See 
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 931-35; Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 697 (1986). 
222 I have not undertaken to quantify the decisions on a state-by-state basis, but state 
severability regimes function much like the federal system: A strong presumption of sever-
ability can be overcome by judicially perceived legislative intent. See Dorf, supra note 26, 
at 285 (describing state law as "remarkably uniform on questions of severability," with 
each state's practice tracking presumption that statutes are severable "unless the party 
claiming nonseverability can show that: (1) severance would leave an incoherent statute, or 
(2) the legislature would not have enacted the statute without the invalid portion"). 
223 In City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), and United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 
171 (1983), for example, the Court invalidated the statutes so far as they were unconstitu-
tional, but no further. In both cases, the Court neither mentioned severance nor suggested 
that its holding of partial unconstitutionality should occasion inseverability analysis. 
224 See Stem, supra note 15, at 101-02 ("The only general conclusion which can be 
drawn from ... [an] analysis of what the Supreme Court has both said and done ... is that 
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Notwithstanding the relative infrequency of inferred insever-
ability, not all cases are of equal weight, and the inferred insever-
ability holdings tend to be heavies. Both Booker and Northern 
Pipeline, for instance, required systemic changes in federal adjudica-
tion. Should the potential for disruption that comes from eliminating 
inferred inseverability in these cases with systemic impacts count 
against the proposed displacement approach? To the contrary: The 
case for political branch involvement in restructuring is strongest in 
precisely such consequential cases. And although there is nothing that, 
in theory, forecloses legislative involvement after a holding of insever-
ability, the effect of such a decision, in practice, can be to take away 
the perceived need for such involvement.225 
Requiring the legislature explicitly to provide for any fallback law 
to take effect in the event of partial unconstitutionality not only pro-
vides a clear backdrop against which to legislate, but it also operates 
as a preference-estimating default rule. Congress often includes sever-
ability clauses in legislation and only rarely includes inseverability 
clauses, a pattern that "suggests that in the vast majority of cases, 
Congress intends its statutes to be severable and that when it does not, 
it says so."226 This pattern also holds at the state level. In fact, many 
states have enacted statutes that set a default rule of severability.227 
To all these benefits that would flow from a clear statement rule 
requiring a deviation from severability within an excision-based 
framework, the proposed displacement approach adds explanatory 
simplicity and the avoidance of judicial lawmaking. The explanatory 
simplicity runs along a few dimensions. First, the displacement 
approach makes it unnecessary to attribute implied severance analysis 
to all instances of as-applied adjudication and to all holdings of partial 
unconstitutionality from which that explicit severance analysis is cur-
rently conspicuously absent (even though conceptually required 
within the current excision-based framework). 
the Court avails itself of one formula or another in order to justify results which seem to it 
to be desirable for other reasons."). 
225 In this respect, Booker and Northern Pipeline present a striking contrast. Whereas 
the Court in Northern Pipeline used inseverability to goad congressional action by 
expanding the consequences of the constitutional holding, the Court in Booker used a 
combination of severability and inseverability holdings to render unnecessary the need for 
congressional action. Cf N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 88 ("This limited stay will afford Congress 
an opportunity to reconstitute the bankruptcy courts or to adopt other valid means of 
adjudication ... . ");Booker, 543 U.S. at 227 ("[T]wo provisions of the Sentencing Reform 
Act of 1984 (SRA) that have the effect of making the Guidelines mandatory must be inval-
idated in order to allow the statute to operate in a manner consistent with congressional 
intent."). 
226 Shumsky, supra note 15, at 276. 
227 See Dorf, supra note 26, at 285-86 & 295 app. 
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Second, displacement without inferred fallback law allows the 
absence of law to be treated as such. Existing doctrine rests on the 
mistaken presupposition that the question of fallback law for a par-
tially unconstitutional statute is always within the statute's 
"domain"-that is, that the statute supplies law for answering the 
question posed of it.228 There is often no provision in a partially 
unconstitutional statute directing what should be done in the case of 
partial invalidity. By imposing an imaginative reconstruction approach 
to statutory construction on every partially unconstitutional statute, 
existing doctrine begs the antecedent question of whether statutory 
construction is to be engaged in at all. In circumstances such as 
Booker, in which a statute runs up against a constitutional problem 
that could not have been anticipated at the time of enactment, it is 
utterly fictional to treat the statute as if it contained an answer to the 
question of what the fallback law should be. Such a fiction would be 
easier to swallow if severability doctrine were inevitable-but it is not. 
Third, the proposed displacement approach makes it unnecessary 
to posit the existence of a "severance power" possessed by the judi-
ciary.229 Michael Dorf has argued that, without severability, "any judi-
cial decision finding any law unconstitutional, on its face or as applied, 
would call into question the entire legal code."230 A corollary is that 
"a statute that has unconstitutional applications cannot be constitu-
tionally applied to anyone, even to those whose conduct is not consti-
tutionally privileged, unless the court can sever the unconstitutional 
applications of the statute from the constitutionally permitted 
ones."231 Similarly, David Gans has written that "without some sever-
ance power, a court would have to invalidate a statute as a whole if 
even one of the statute's clauses or provisions violated the 
Constitution."232 These statements make sense within an excision-
based framework for judicial review but not within the framework for 
judicial review set forth in Marbury and in the federal and state case 
law of the surrounding decades. Inseverability is itself an artifact of 
modern severability doctrine, not a necessary feature of judicial 
review. Because the proposed displacement approach does not 
require positing a "severance power," it avoids the problems of 
228 For criticism of this presumption, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 
U. Ctt1. L. REv. 533, 536 (1983) ("To find that there is 'law' on a given subject is to endow 
the courts with authority they lacked before. It is therefore worthwhile to demand that, 
before courts begin the process of 'construction,' they ascertain that the legislature has 
conferred the power of interpretation."). 
229 See Gans, supra note 55, at 653. 
230 Dorf, supra note 8, at 370. 
231 Dorf, supra note 26, at 238. 
232 Gans, supra note 55, at 653. 
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needing to explain and justify the courts' possession of such a power, 
where it comes from, and how far it reaches. 
The final advantage of displacement without inferred fallback law 
is that it avoids the routine judicial lawmaking-by-subtraction that 
excision requires. Within the excision approach, every holding of par-
tial unconstitutionality requires a judicial operation beyond judicial 
review itself to decide what to do with the constitutional remainder: 
The court must either (i) make a new law consisting of the old law 
minus its unconstitutional parts, or (ii) expand invalidity beyond 
unconstitutionality. Within the proposed displacement approach, by 
contrast, there is no need for a court to perform any operation on a 
statute to prevent metastasis from partial unconstitutionality into total 
invalidity. The only remaining issue after a holding of partial unconsti-
tutionality is interpretive-what, if anything, did the legislature pro-
vide? A conception of constitutional adjudication that envisions the 
Court making a "new law" consisting of the old law minus its uncon-
stitutional parts whenever it uses severability doctrine to contain the 
effects of a constitutional ruling assigns the judiciary an avowedly leg-
islative function. The displacement approach, by contrast, cleanly 
divides responsibility between the Court and Congress: The Court is 
responsible for enforcing the Constitution, and Congress is respon-
sible for legislating. 
By authorizing the Court to devise a scheme approximating what 
Congress would have wanted, even when the idea that Congress actu-
ally wanted anything is a fiction, existing severability doctrine leads to 
law for which neither the Court nor Congress is entirely answerable. 
For example, who is responsible for the federal sentencing scheme 
that is now in place in the wake of the Booker decision? Not 
Congress, which legislated a different system; not the Court, which 
only ruled as it did because of what it concluded the enacting 
Congress would have wanted. And while it is true that Congress can 
step in at any time to change the current federal sentencing scheme, 
any changes it wishes to make must pass through the demanding 
bicameralism and presentment requirements of Article I, § 7, while 
the Court remains free to continue refining the federal sentencing 
system without such constraints. 
C. Qualifications and Objections 
Having set forth the displacement approach and described its 
advantages, various qualifications and objections warrant considera-
tion. An initial qualification relates to the ambition of the proposal. 
Recovering the original approach to partial unconstitutionality shifts 
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the understanding of judicial review in a manner that is ambitious in 
one respect but modest in another. The shift from excision to displace-
ment is ambitious inasmuch as displacement is a replacement for the 
reigning general framework for judicial review. After such a shift, 
every single instance of judicial review would be understood in terms 
of displacement rather than excision. Notwithstanding the magnitude 
of the conceptual shift, however, the impact on case outcomes would 
be modest, as noted above. 
A second qualification relates to the ease of implementing the 
displacement approach as well as to its theoretical underpinnings. The 
implementation of displacement without inferred fallback law would 
be relatively simple within any given state system or the federal 
system. Courts would simply stop engaging in the counterfactual spec-
ulation required by modern severability doctrine; it might even take a 
while before anyone noticed any change. Matters become more com-
plicated when considering the problem of partial unconstitutionality 
across systems. Suppose inferred inseverability analysis were elimi-
nated from federal law but not from a particular state's law. In such a 
situation, may a federal court reviewing a partially unconstitutional 
state statute use the proposed displacement approach if state law 
mandates the use of inferred inseverability analysis? An absolute inca-
pacity for such analysis in federal courts would result in the potential 
for different outcomes depending on whether the same constitutional 
challenge is litigated in state or federal court. 
These considerations point to a significant limitation on the argu-
ments for the proposed displacement approach. If the arguments 
against inferring fallback law yielded the conclusion that such infer-
ence is categorically beyond the power of an Article III court-say, 
because it calls for a task necessarily legislative rather than judicial in 
nature-then federal courts could not engage in it at all. Yet the argu-
ments need not be taken to establish such a sweeping proposition. 
After all, federal courts have been inferring fallback law for almost a 
century and a half. The arguments against such inference are better 
understood as establishing a limit on the federal courts vis-a-vis 
Congress with respect to the allocation of federal legislative power, 
rather than a categorical absence of judicial authority to infer legisla-
tive intent more generally. At its core, the argument for displacement 
without inferred fallback law rests on judgments about how best to 
implement the separation of powers in the U.S. Constitution. 
To the extent that any given state seeks to mirror the federal divi-
sion of separated powers, the arguments against inferred fallback law 
carry over to that state system. But such mirroring is not 
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mandatory,233 and federal courts facing partially unconstitutional state 
statutes should respect state separation-of-powers schemes that 
empower the state judiciary to infer fallback law. Formally, the exer-
cise in which the federal court would be engaged is no different from 
the state's highest-court-predictive approach required when facing any 
other question of state substantive law.234 
Another qualification relates to situations in which displacement 
alone does not appear to provide sufficient guidance about just what is 
to be displaced. Consider, for instance, a state system for regulating 
wine sales that discriminates against out-of-state wine shippers by per-
mitting in-state wineries to ship directly to consumers, while requiring 
that all other shippers must sell through in-state wholesalers, resulting 
in higher costs.235 Suppose that this discriminatory treatment with 
respect to direct shipping is held to violate the Dormant Commerce 
Clause because it discriminates against out-of-state wineries.236 In the 
absence of explicit guidance from the legislature, should the court 
cure the discrimination by closing direct shipment to in-state shippers 
or, instead, by opening direct shipment to out-of-state shippers? 
Under current law, a court must discern unexpressed legislative 
intent to determine the remedy that "best furthers the legislative pur-
poses animating the underlying statutory scheme. "237 If courts cannot 
engage in that sort of hypothesizing about legislative intent regarding 
fallback law-and they cannot under the proposed displacement 
approach-then what should courts do in circumstances like these? 
The short answer is that courts should look to constitutional law 
rather than unexpressed legislative purpose in formulating a 
remedy.238 
233 See Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues": Rethinking the Judicial 
Function, 114 HARV. L. REv. 1833, 1837 (2001) ("[F]unctions that seem intuitively nonju-
dicial in the federal system are assigned to the judicial branch in some states, and judicial 
officers discharge them comfortably."). 
234 Cf Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. 
L. REv. 2085, 2152 (2002) ("[S]tate statutes arrive in federal court hand in hand with their 
own homegrown state interpretive methodology" because "legislating interpretive method-
ology is, within limits, an incident of the power to legislate."). 
235 See Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that North Carolina's 
discriminatory treatment of out-of-state wineries violates Commerce Clause). 
236 See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005) (holding that New York and Michigan's 
discriminatory treatment of out-of-state wineries violates Commerce Clause). 
237 Evan H. Caminker, A Norm-Based Remedial Model for Under-Inclusive Statutes, 95 
YALE L.J. 1185, 1185 (1986). 
238 See id. at 1202-03 ("[R]ather than choose the remedy most consistent with policies 
underlying the statutory scheme, courts should select the remedy that best promotes values 
embedded in the constitutional text."); Gans, supra note 55, at 696 ("Severability should 
not be treated as a legislative question to be answered by inspecting the intent of the 
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Even if the Dormant Commerce Clause problem can be cured by 
either the court's contraction or its expansion of the favored treat-
ment, it does not follow that constitutional doctrine is or ought to be 
indifferent between the two "remedial starting point[ s]. "239 Dormant 
Commerce Clause doctrine implements a national-market norm that 
supports an economic system in which "every farmer and every 
craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty ... that no 
home embargoes will withhold his exports, and no foreign state will by 
customs duties or regulations exclude them."240 When the discrimina-
tory wine-shipping scheme described above is held to violate this doc-
trine, courts should resort to the underlying national-market 
constitutional norm in devising an appropriate remedy. Thus, the 
court should order expansion of the direct-shipping benefit as a 
"remedial starting point,"241 regardless of what the court believes the 
legislature would have intended. If contraction of the benefit available 
to in-state interests would not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause, 
and if the legislature prefers that approach instead, it can so provide 
by passing future legislation. But the court, charged with remedying 
the constitutional violation resulting from the system that favors in-
state interests, should not try to divine the enacting legislature's 
unenacted intentions. Instead, it ought to advance the underlying con-
stitutional national-market norm with its remedy. 
In addition to the foregoing qualifications, displacement without 
inferred fallback law is subject to a number of potential objections 
that must be considered. I address here two of the most prominent. 
First, even if the historical analysis is persuasive in establishing 
that the original approach to partial unconstitutionality had no need 
for the hypothetical intent-based analysis required by modem sever-
ability doctrine, one could object that returning to a version of that 
approach would be mistaken. The argument here is that severability at 
some point became necessary as legislation became more complex. 
One response to this critique is that even if legislation became more 
complex throughout the nineteenth century, it is not as if legislation 
was ever that simple. Another response is to question whether legisla-
tive intent-based excision analysis is the most appropriate response to 
the increased statutory complexity that has occurred. The potential for 
holdings of unconstitutionality to upset legislative bargains has been 
present from the beginning of judicial review. If protecting implicit 
enacting legislature. Instead, it is a remedial question for the courts to be considered in 
light of structural constitutional principles, including separation of powers."). 
239 Caminker, supra note 237, at 1201. 
240 H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949). 
241 Caminker, supra note 237, at 1201. 
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legislative bargains about partially unconstitutional statutes is the 
province of the judicial department, why did it take five decades from 
Marbury for a state court to develop a doctrine to serve that 
function242 and another two decades for the United States Supreme 
Court to adopt it?243 
A second objection to displacement without inferred fallback law 
flips the historical perspective: If courts have been engaged in legisla-
tive intent-based excision analysis for a century and a half, can it any 
longer be contended that such analysis is outside the judicial function? 
This objection need not rest on a form of separation-of-powers 
adverse possession. Professor Paul Bator was correct that the judicial 
power is "a purposive institutional concept, whose content is a 
product of history and custom distilled in the light of experience and 
expediency."244 With severability doctrine, however, experience has 
revealed that expediency has too often overtaken history and custom. 
The problem is not simply that the existing excision approach is 
unmoored from traditional understandings of the federal judicial func-
tion and the Constitution's allocation of the legislative and judicial 
powers, but that the modern approach is subject to manipulation. 
Even those who accept the inevitability of severability should be 
troubled by the manner in which the Supreme Court has wielded this 
manipulable power to invalidate civil rights laws,245 the federal 
income tax,246 and New Deal legislation,247 among other statutes. 
Should we make room in the "purposive institutional concept" of the 
judicial power for this doctrine and the judicial role it both presup-
poses and perpetuates? Not when there is an alternative whose foun-
dation in traditional understandings of the judicial function is as solid 
as that of the proposed displacement approach. 
242 See supra notes 144-50 and accompanying text. 
243 See United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875) ("We are not able to reject a part 
which is unconstitutional, and retain the remainder, because it is not possible to separate 
that which is unconstitutional, if there be any such, from that which is not."); see also 
Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U.S. 80, 89 (1877) ("Statutes that are constitutional in part only, 
will be upheld so far as they are not in conflict with the Constitution, provided the allowed 
and prohibited parts are severable."). 
244 Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative 
Courts Under Article Ill, 65 IND. L.J. 233, 265 (1990). 
245 E.g., United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 644 (1883) (invalidating statute providing 
remedy for abridgement of equal protection by private conspirators); United States v. 
Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221-22 (1875) (invalidating voter intimidation legislation). 
246 E.g., Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895) (invalidating 
federal income tax scheme). 
247 E.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 315-16 (1936) (invalidating statute 
providing for regulatory oversight of coal industry); R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 
330, 360 (1935) (invalidating statute setting up compulsory retirement and pension system 
for interstate railroad carriers). 
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CONCLUSION 
This Article's historical analysis of the first several decades of 
post-Marbury judicial review in the United States clearly demon-
strates that modern severability doctrine is not necessary for a work-
able system of judicial review. There is therefore no need for the 
courts to continue the hypothetical mind-reading that modern sever-
ability doctrine requires. Courts should instead deploy a reconstructed 
version of the displacement approach that operated before the advent 
of modern severability doctrine. Depriving courts of the power to 
reshape partially unconstitutional statutes to fit their perception of 
what the legislature would have wanted better implements the 
Constitution's separation of powers. 
In the end, metaphors matter, and excision is pernicious. As a 
description of what courts do to partially unconstitutional legislation, 
the imagery of excision underwrites a conception of the judicial role 
that is avowedly legislative. The acceptance of excision also effaces an 
understanding of how courts can deal with partial unconstitutionality 
in a manner properly judicial. Looking back to the original displace-
ment approach to partial unconstitutionality points the way forward, 
toward restoration of review without rewriting. 
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